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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Appellants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., and its wholly owned
subsidiary Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. (collectively, "Saint Alphonsus") appeal an
award in the amount of $36.3 million (plus fees and costs of $2.1 million) on contract and tort
claims asserted by Respondent MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), a business partnership created
in 1985 by Saint Alphonsus, two other hospitals and a consortium of doctors for the purpose of
acquiring and operating magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") equipment.
The central issue in this case is whether Saint Alphonsus violated MRIA's legal rights by
its interactions with Intermountain Medical Imaging ("!MI"), a full-service imaging center
created in 1999 by the group of radiologists that had served the radiology needs of Saint
Alphonsus's patients for more than twenty years, and by its decision in 2004 to dissociate from
MRIA and formally affiliate with !MI in the provision of MRI services. At trial, Saint
Alphonsus presented evidence that its actions were motivated by a desire to promote optimal
patient care and were entirely consistent with the MRIA partnership agreement and Saint
Alphonsus's other legal duties. For its part, MRIA argued that Saint Alphonsus had acted with
bad-faith indifference to its obligations to MRIA and had improperly helped divert MRI business
from MRIA' s affiliates to IM!.
Saint Alphonsus contends on appeal that the jury's verdict for MRIA resulted from a
series of critical legal errors that preordained the result. Specifically, Saint Alphonsus contends
that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment for MRIA on its claim that Saint
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Alphonsus "wrongfully" dissociated from the partnership in 2004, and that the court should
instead have granted summary judgment for Saint Alphonsus on that claim. Further, the repeated
references to this legally incorrect holding by the court and MRIA's counsel during trial
prevented the jury from fairly and impartially evaluating the evidence, and virtually compelled a
finding of liability on all other claims. This prejudice was compounded, Saint Alphonsus
contends, by the court's erroneous admission of privileged attorney-client communications
advising Saint Alphonsus about the legal risks of dissociation and evidence of Saint Alphonsus's
rejection of an MRlA settlement offer, both of which MRIA used in conjunction with the court's
holding of"wrongful" dissociation to support the claim of bad-faith conduct. Finally, Saint
Alphonsus submits that, entirely apart from these errors, it is entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because MRIA's proof of damages under two alternative theories is
legally and factually insufficient, and the amounts claimed and awarded under each bear no
relationship to injuries actually caused by Saint Alphonsus or suffered by MRJA.

B.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings

Saint Alphonsus is a hospital that has served the medical needs of the greater Boise area
for more than a century. It provides its patients with a full range of medical care, including
access to top-level radiology services. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2022, L. 23 top. 2023, L. 17; Tr., Vol. Ill,
p. 4214, L. 14-25.) Radiology is a medical specialty involving the use of medical imaging
technologies, such as x-ray, fluoroscopy, ultrasound, CT scan, and MRI, for diagnostic and other
treatment purposes. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1093, L. 12 top. 1095, L. 9.) TypicaJJy, a patient in need of
medical imaging is referred by the patient's treating physician to an imaging facility where
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technicians use imaging equipment to produce images or "scans" of the patient's body. (/d)
These scans are then interpreted by a radiologist in consultation with the patient's treating
physician. (Id) At Saint Alphonsus, the interpretation of medical images has for decades been
performed by the Saint Alphonsus Radiology Group, also known as Gem State Radiology
("SARG/GSR"), an organized group of radiologists under an exclusive contract to serve the
professional radiological needs of Saint Alphonsus's patients. (R., Vol. V, pp. 907, 911.)
MRIA is an Idaho general partnership formed on April 26, 1985, by Saint Alphonsus,
two other hospitals and Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. ("DMR"), a corporation created by
five specialist physicians for the purpose of holding a partnership interest in MRIA. (R., Vol. V .,
p. 909 i! I 0.) (A fourth hospital joined the partnership in 1995.) The purpose of MRIA was to
acquire and operate equipment for the then-emerging medical imaging technology known as
magnetic resonance imaging or MRI. (App. 3 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 1.6).) 1 To this end, MRIA
formed two limited partnerships: MRI Limited Partnership, doing business as MRI Center of
Idaho ("Center"), which owned and operated an MRI device at a facility located on the Saint
Alphonsus hospital campus, and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership ("Mobile"), which owned and
operated mobile MRI devices throughout the region. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1786, L. 11-14; Tr., Vol. Ill,
p. 2944, L. 17 to p. 2945, L. 11.) Profits from these operations were distributed to the respective
owners of the Center and Mobile limited partnerships. (Trial Ex. 4024 § 3 .2; Trial Ex. 4028
§ 3.2.) MRIA owned 30% of each limited partnership, and served as the general partner of both.

1

Citations to "App._" refer to the pages of the Appendix attached to this brief. The.
Appendix contains pertinent excerpts of the trial exhibits cited herein.
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(App. 7, 11, 14, 39 (Trial Ex. 4024 §§ 1.3.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4028 § 1.3.2; Trial Ex. 4247, p. 7).)2
MRIA provides no MRI services directly, but rather derives all of its revenues from the
distribution of profits based on its ownership interests in Center and Mobile and from a
"management fee" equal to 7.5% of their revenues. (App. 9, 11, 15-16, 28 (Trial Ex. 4024

§§ 3.2.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4028 §§ 3.2.2, 4.2; Trial Ex. 4118, p. 3).)
For years following the creation ofMRIA, doctors at Saint Alphonsus used Center for the
technical service of producing MRI scans, while relying on the radiologists from SARG/GSR for
the professional service of interpreting those scans. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2383, L. 4-15.) By 1998,
SARG/GSR was led by Dr. David Giles, one of the five shareholders ofDMR, and had under his
leadership recruited several of the nation's top radiologists. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2654, L. 14 top.
2655, L. 11; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3026, L. 5-8; Tr., Vol. III, p. 3280, L. 1 top. 3281, L. 2.) These
radiologists-who with the exception of Dr. Giles did not share in the ownership of MRIAbegan to formulate plans for an outpatient imaging center that would provide a full range of
medical imaging services, including both MRI and a variety of other imaging services (e.g., CT
scan) not provided by Center. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2655, L. 22 top. 2656, L. 9.) Once SARG/GSR
acquired land in downtown Boise for this purpose, in August 1998, Dr. Giles disclosed the plans
to Saint Alphonsus and encouraged Saint Alphonsus to get involved. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3054,

L. 13 top. 3057, L. 15; id. p. 3061, L. 10 top. 3062, L. 3.)

2

The remaining ownership interests in Center and Mobile differ from one another, with nonidentical groups of limited partners owning shares. (See App. 7, 14, 39 (Trial Ex. 4024; Trial Ex.
4028; Trial Ex. 4247 p. 7).) Saint Alphonsus is a limited partner owning 14% of Center and 11%
of Mobile. (Id.)
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In response, Saint Alphonsus sought to facilitate a combination of Center's operations
with those of the SARG/GSR imaging center, first, by arranging a merger ofSARG/GSR's and
MRIA's respective interests, and, when that effort failed, by working out a deal whereby Saint
Alphonsus would exchange its interest in Mobile for additional ownership interest in Center and
purchase the rest of Center outright. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3067, L. 25 top. 3068, L. 14; id. p. 4014,

L. 15 top. 4026, L. 3; App. 18, 21-23 (Trial Ex. 4062, p. 2; Trial Ex. 4072, pp. 2-3; Trial Ex.
4085).) By 2000, it appeared a deal would be reached, but in April or May of that year, DMR
decided not to support the deal on the terms proposed. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4023, L. I to p. 4025, L.
14.)
The SARG/GSR facility, by then known as IMI, began operations on September I, 1999.
(Tr., Vol. III, p. 3088, L. 2-4.) Treating physicians at Saint Alphonsus and elsewhere-often due
to their preexisting relationships with the SARG/GSR radiologists operating IMJ-began
referring some patients needing MRI scans to IM! instead of Center. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3909, L. 5
top. 3910, L. l; id. p. 3994, L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16; id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.) On July 1,
2001, Saint Alphonsus entered into an operating agreement that by its terms made Saint
Alphonsus a partner in "the non-MRI portion of [IM!]." (App. 30-31 (Trial Ex. 4226 § 1.1).) At
the same time, notwithstanding the failure of its efforts in 1999 and 2000, Saint Alphonsus
continued to seek a mutually beneficial arrangement between the parties, and was advised by
investment banking firm Shattuck Hammond in connection with that endeavor. (Tr., Vol. III, p.
3789, L. 16-20; id. p. 3791, L. 19 top. 3792, L. JO.) Shattuck Hammond suggested that Saint
Alphonsus try to purchase Center and merge it with !MI. (App. 41 (Trial Ex. 4272).) Efforts in
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that direction foundered, however, when MRIA refused to allow Shattuck Hammond to share
business valuation data with IMI, and repeated efforts to revive the discussions were abandoned
in late 2003. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3810, L. 25 top. 3812, L. 17; id. p. 3815, L. 20 top. 3822, L. 16.)
With negotiations at an impasse, Saint Alphonsus gave notice on February 24, 2004, of its intent
to dissociate from MRIA. (See App. 43 (Trial Ex. 4329).)
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation became effective on April 1, 2004, and on October 18,
2004, Saint Alphonsus brought this lawsuit seeking a judicial determination of the amount owed
to it for its interest in the partnership pursuant to Idaho Code§ 53-3-701. (R., Vol. I, pp. 55-62.)
On May 20, 2005, MRIA filed counterclaims alleging that the 2004 dissociation was wrongful
and that, prior to dissociation, Saint Alphonsus had breached its fiduciary duties to the
partnership and breached the partnership agreement's covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
allegedly assisting IM! and thereby causing Center and Mobile to lose business to IM!. (Id. pp.
63-79.) On January 31, 2006, MRIA filed additional counterclaims against Saint Alphonsus,
including claims for breach of the partnership agreement's non-compete clause, interference with
prospective contractual relations or business expectations, and civil conspiracy, as well as a
third-party complaint against SARG/GSR, !MI and one of their affiliates (all of whom settled
withMRIApriortotrial). (Id. pp.141-78.)
On July 24, 2006, in response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
Saint Alphonsus's dissociation had been wrongful as a matter oflaw. (R., Vol. II, p. 396.) The
court rejected Saint Alphonsus's argument that its dissociation was proper under the 1998 Idaho
Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"), which created-and made retroactive to all
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existing partnerships-a right of all partners to dissociate absent an "express provision" limiting
that right. In doing so, the court relied on Section 6.1 of the 1985 partnership agreement, which
provides that "(a]ny Hospital Partner may withdraw ... if' it reasonably believes that "continued
participation" in the partnership jeopardizes the Hospital Partner's tax exempt status or its ability
to secure reimbursement, is contrary to ethical principles of the Catholic Church, or is in
violation oflaw. (App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1).) The court reasoned that this withdrawal right
under the 1985 contract is synonymous with the right to dissociate subsequently created by
RUPA in 1998, and that the parties intended the enumerated grounds for withdrawal (none of
which was applicable here) to be exclusive. (R., Vol. II, pp. 394-95.) The court rejected the
argument that Section 6.1-drafted before the RUP A-created power to dissociate even existeddid not eliminate dissociation rights, holding that even "assuming ... that [Section 6.1] was an
addition of rights under the U[niform] P[artnership] A[ct], [it] is clearly restrictive viewed in the
context of the RUPA, which applies retroactively to all Idaho partnership agreements." (Id
p. 394.) According to the court, Section 6.1 was thus an "express provision" making dissociation
"wrongful" within the meaning ofRUPA. (/d) On Saint Alphonsus's motion for
reconsideration, the court rejected the argument that RUP A retroactively created a new power to
dissociate that was applicable to pre-RUP A partnership agreements. It held that the "decision to
include section 6.1 in the Partnership Agreement is ... properly characterized as the replacement
of a default provision," even though the RUP A provision allowing partners to dissociate without
causing dissolution did not even exist at the time. (R., Vol. III, p. 54 l .)
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On December 20, 2006, MRIA moved to add a claim for breach of fiduciary duty brought
"on behalf of' limited partnerships Center and Mobile. (R., Vol. III, p. 586.) Saint Alphonsus
opposed the filing of this counterclaim on the grounds that MRIA could not state a claim "on
behalf of' the limited partnerships, which had the power to sue in their own names, and that
Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to those entities. (Exhibit to R. #57, pp. 4-5.) On
February 6, 2007, the court allowed MRIA's new counterclaims, reasoning that MRIA had the
authority to bring claims on behalf of the limited partnerships pursuant to the limited partnership
agreements. (R., Vol. V, pp. 868-71.) Then, on June 13, 2007, the court denied Saint
Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the fiduciary duty claim asserted on behalf of the
limited partnerships. (R., Vol. X, p. 1880.) The court acknowledged that Saint Alphonsus owed
no statutory fiduciary duties to Center or Mobile, but concluded that a question of fact remained
whether a common-law fiduciary duty might exist based on the nature of the relationship
between Saint Alphonsus and the limited partnerships. (Id pp. 1876-80.) The court ruled that
this issue would be decided by the jury. (Id p. 1880.)
As trial approached, both parties filed numerous motions in limine, three of which are
relevant here. First, Saint Alphonsus moved to exclude, on the grounds of attorney-client
privilege, portions of an internal memorandum (App. 32 (Trial Ex. 4239)) prepared by
investment banking firm Shattuck Hammond. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1453-55; Confidential Exhibit
to R. #4, at Ex. A.) Shattuck Hammond had been retained in 2001 by Givens Pursley, Saint
Alphonsus's counsel, to assist in providing legal advice, and the memorandum summarized
advice given to Saint Alphonsus by Givens Pursley regarding the "likely ... litigation" and "risk

-8-

of ... breaching" a fiduciary duty if Saint Alphonsus dissociated. (R., Vol. XI, p. 2184.) The
court held that these statements were not privileged. (R., Vol. XI, pp.2116-18.)

Second, Saint Alphonsus filed a motion in limine regarding MRIA's so-called "purchase
price" damage theory. (R., Vol. VIII, pp. 1462-65.) Under this theory, MRIA claimed that
recoverable damages for wrongful dissociation should be measured by the estimated value or
hypothetical purchase price of Center. (R., Vol. IX, pp. 1694-97.) Saint Alphonsus argued that
the value of Center-the price a purchaser would have had to pay to buy the whole businesswas not a proper measure of the diminution of Center's profits or value as a result of the
dissociation. (Exhibit to R. #137, pp. 5-7.) The court initially filed an order appearing to grant
Saint Alphonsus's motion (R., Vol. XI, pp. 2120-22), but after MRIA filed a "Request for
Clarification," the court reversed itself and held that the purchase price evidence could be used if
"further foundation [was] established" as to the 2001 valuation's "relevance and probative value
as to damages or the value of the partnership." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2164.)

Third, and finally, Saint Alphonsus moved that MRIA be "prohibit[ed] ... from asserting
at trial that [Saint Alphonsus'] withdrawal was 'unlawful,' 'wrongful,' 'misconduct,' or
otherwise contrary to law." (Exhibit to R. #136, pp. 2-3.) The court ruled that MRIA could refer
to the dissociation as "wrongful" because that term was "technically and legally accurate," but
could not argue that dissociation was "unlawful, ilJegal, or a violation of law" because such
descriptions were "inflammatory" and created an "undeniable danger of unfair prejudice to Saint
Alphonsus." (R., Vol. XI, p. 2123.)
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On August 6, 2007, MRIA's counterclaims proceeded to trial on the issues of
(1) damages from the already determined "wrongful" dissociation; (2) an alternative theory that
the dissociation was wrongful because it occurred prior to expiration of a definite partnership
term; (3) breach of the partnership agreement's non-compete clause; (4) breach of the
partnership agreement's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) interference with
prospective contractual relations or business expectations; (6) breach of fiduciary duty to MRIA,
Center, or Mobile; and (7) civil conspiracy.
MRIA made the court's summary judgment ruling that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully
dissociated the centerpiece ofits case before the jury. MRIA first raised the topic during jury

voir dire. 3 In MRIA's opening statement to the jury, its counsel reminded the jury repeatedly of
the court's ruling:

.

•

"Now, the court has said that it has found that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully
withdrew from the partnership ... it's been discussed during jury selection. It
will be discussed in opening statement. You'll hear a lot about that." (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 997, L. 21 to p. 99_8, L. 1.)

•

"'Wrongful withdrawal' is something that I want you to look for when I take you
through the story of this case. Okay?" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 998, L. 19-20.)

•

"You recall the court has found that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew. Our
experts will testify that the lost scans, as a result of wrongful withdrawal$29,500, 000." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 1044, L. 15-18.)

3

MRIA's attorney told the venire panel that the case was "about a partnership that ultimately
failed when Saint Alphonsus walked away from it. The court has determined in this case,
already, that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully withdrew from this partnership in 2004." (Tr., Vol. I.,
p. 616, L. 12-17_; see also id. p. 922, L. 9-11 ("you're going to hear that Judge McLaughlin has
entered an order that finds that St. Alphonsus breached its contract with MRI Associates").)
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MRIA also emphasized this ruling during the testimony of several key witnesses, including its
own experts. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2734, L. 10-13; Tr., Vol. III, p. 2875, L. 4-9.)
To address these repeated references to "wrongful" conduct, Saint Alphonsus attempted
to argue, as suggested by the court's pretrial ruling (see supra p. 9), that hs dissociation was not
"unlawful." (Tr., Vol. I, p. 620, L. 6-13.) However, the court forbid any such statements. (Tr.,
Vol. III, p. 3960, L. 16 to p. 3962, L. 1.) Saint Alphonsus also proposed jury instructions
clarifying the meaning of "wrongful" as not necessarily implying misconduct (Exhibit to R. #230,
Instr. 3), but that instruction was rejected. The court instead instructed the jury that "Saint
Alphonsus breached [the MRIA partnership agreement] when it wrongfully withdrew from
MRIA on April 1, 2004," and that it "ha[d] been determined by the court to be a wrongful
dissociation." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4271, L. IO top. 4275, L. 4; id p. 4283, L. 6-15.) MRIA
emphasized these instructions and the court's ruling in closing argument:
•

"[W]e talked about three betrayals. And the first one, really, the simplest in that
it's the wrongful dissociation. Okay? And I've got some good news, and I've got
some bad news for you. The good news is that you don't have to worry about
liability on wrongful dissociation. Okay? The bad news is that if you don't like
that decision, there isn't anything you can do about it. That's the court's order.
The court looked at the evidence. The court looked at the contract. The court
looked at the testimony of the witnesses and concluded as a matter of law that
there was a breach of the contract. That's it." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 1-12.)

•

"Let me show you [Jury] Instruction 39 ... what I want you to focus on-we can
read through this. 'The court has determined that Saint Alphonsus has dissociated,
and it was wrongful."' (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4381, L. 17-21.)

•

"[Y]ou were told [Saint Alphonsus] wrongful[ly] dissociated .... " (Tr., Vol. III,
p. 4385, L. 20-21.)
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In addition to focusing on the court's holding that Saint Alphonsus had acted wrongfully,
MRJA's counsel during trial repeatedly relied on the privileged communications memorialized in
the Shattuck Hammond memorandum-which counsel characterized as one of "the most critical
documents in the case" (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 20)-to argue that Saint Alphonsus and its
officers had acted in bad faith and with indifference to their lawyers' advice about Saint
Alphonsus's legal obligations to MRJA. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, p. 1861, L. 21 top. 1866, L. I;
id. p. 1874, L. 13 top. 1878, L. 16; Tr., Vol. III, p. 3593, L. 22 top. 3596, L. 8; id. p. 4302, L.

7-23; id. p. 4317, L. I 0-19; id. p. 4321, L. 10-18.) MRIA also introduced, over Saint
Alphonsus's objection (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1239, L. 9 top. 1246, L. 24), a settlement offer that had
been proffered by MRIA and rejected by Saint Alphonsus. (See App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4332).)
MRJA told the jury that Saint Alphonsus's rejection of this settlement offer was a "telltale" sign
of Saint Alphonsus's alleged bad faith. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4322, L. 1-15; see also id. p. 4296, L.
11-20; id. p. 4390, L. 9-14.)
With respect to damages, MRIA was allowed to present alternative theories to the jury.
The first, the "lost scan" theory, focused exclusively on the number of MRI scans that were
allegedly "diverted" from Center or Mobile to IMI. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2741, L. 7 top. 2753, L. 7.)
The second was the "purchase price" damage theory (see supra p. 9), which the district court
allowed to be introduced over Saint Alphonsus's objection. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2887, L. 10 to
p. 2892, L. 4.) This theory was explicitly presented to the jury as the measure of damages
resulting from the wrongful dissociation, while the "lost scan" theory was presented as
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measuring damages on all other claims. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2887, L. 10 top. 2892, L. 4; see also id.
p. 4310, L. 15 top. 4312, L. 4; id. p. 4383, L. 9-16.)
The jury was given several disputed instructions. First, in connection with the claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, Saint Alphonsus proposed instructions that would have distinguished
between the statutory duties owed by Saint Alphonsus to MRIA as one of its general partners,
and the separate common-Jaw fiduciary duty, if any, owed to the limited partnerships, Center and
Mobile. (Exhibit to R. #231, Instrs. 29-30 & Special Verdict Question 12.) The district court
denied this request, and instead gave a combined jury instruction on fiduciary duty that made no
distinction between MRIA and the limited partnerships, and stated that "[a] fiduciary is a person
or entity with a duty to act primarily for the benefit of another." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 to
p. 4822, L. 4.)
Rather than submit to the jury the question whether Saint Alphonsus owed any fiduciary
duties to the limited partnerships, as the court had earlier stated it would (see supra p. 8), the
district court instructed the jury that Saint Alphonsus owed a fiduciary duty to the limited
partnerships (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4822, L. 4), later stating that there was no
reasonable basis on which the jury could doubt that conclusion (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2442-43). The
court submitted only the single question whether Saint Alphonsus had breached a fiduciary duty
owed to MRIA, Center "or" Mobile (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4822, L. 4), and provided
the jury with a verdict form that allowed no alternative but to award any damages to "MRIA"
rather than to the limited partnerships (Exhibit to R. #202, Instr. 44, Question 11 ).
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The jury, after deliberating for approximately ninety minutes, returned a verdict for
MRIA on all of the counterclaims, awarding damages in the amount of$63.5 million. (R.,
Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96.) After determining that the jury had improperly cumulated MRIA's two
alternative damages theories, as MRIA conceded, the court issued a remittitur, reducing the
verdict to $36.3 million. (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2435.) Sitting in equity, the court also determined
that Saint Alphonsus's interest in the partnership was $4.6 million, and ordered that amount
offset from MRIA's award. (R., Vol. XII, p. 231 l.) The court also concluded that MRIA's
claims arose out ofa "commercial transaction" within the meaning ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3)
and accordingly awarded MRIA attorney fees and costs of $2.1 million (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 244849, 2519-20), resulting in a final judgment for MRIA of$33,872,677.63 (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2534).
On October 3, 2007, Saint Alphonsus moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and for a new trial, arguing that the errors described above, among others, required the court to
set aside the jury's verdict. (Exhibit to R. #208.) The district court denied the motions (R., Vol.
XIII, pp. 2426-52), and this appeal followed.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court err in holding, as a matter of law, that a section of a 1985

partnership agreement is an "express provision" prohibiting a partner from exercising a
retroactively applicable power to dissociate that was created in 1998, where the contractual
language does not mention "dissociation" or affirmatively prohibit anything?
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2.

Did the district court's ruling that Saint Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated,

which the court and opposing counsel repeatedly emphasized to the jury throughout the trial, so
prejudice the jury's assessment on the remaining issues as to require a new trial?
3.

Did the district court err in allowing the jury to decide whether the 1985

partnership was for a definite term of years, where a section of the partnership agreement entitled
"Effective Date and Term" defined the term in a way that made it indefinite?
4.

Did the district court prejudicially err in allowing MRIA to show the jury a

memorandum containing legal advice from Saint Alphonsus's attorneys, and a settlement offer
expressly marked as a "Confidential Settlement Offer Made Pursuant to l.R.E. 408," in order to
establish that Saint Alphonsus acted in bad faith?
5.

Must the damage award to MRIA of$36.3 million in lost scan profits be reversed

because:
a.

MRIA, as the general partner of the limited partnerships, itself provided

no scanning services, and any alleged lost scan profits belonged to the limited partnerships,
Center and Mobile?
b.

This award cannot be upheld on the ground that it was actually an award

to Center and/or Mobile, given that the jury did not determine whether Saint Alphonsus was
liable to the limited partnerships, and, in any event, Saint Alphonsus owed them no fiduciary
duty as a matter of law?
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c.

MRIA offered no evidence to prove that Saint Alphonsus actually caused

all or any specific portion of the changes in patient referrals upon which the damage award
depends?
d.

The damage award includes $6.0 million for the period 2015 to 2023,

based on a factually unsupported assertion that the term of the Center limited partnership
agreement had been extended for that period?
6.

Was MRIA's alternative theory of damages, based on the hypothetical full value

of the Center limited partnership in 2001, a legally and factually improper measure of"benefit of
the bargain" damages for the alleged wrongful dissociation from the MRIA partnership?
7.

Given the district court's conclusion that MRIA's claims arose from a commercial

transaction, is Saint Alphonsus entitled to an award of attorneys fees both on appeal and at trial
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)?

ARGUMENT
I.

SAINT ALPHONSUS'S DISSOCIATION FROM MRIA DID NOT BREACH THE
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE CONTRARY PREJUDICED THE
ENTIRE TRIAL
A.

The District Court Incorrectly Ruled That Saint Alphonsus Had Dissociated
In Violation Of An Express Provision Of The Partnership Agreement

The district court erred when it granted summary judgment for MRIA on its claim that
Saint Alphonsus breached the MRIA partnership agreement by dissociating from MRIA in 2004.
The court made this ruling notwithstanding the fact that Idaho's Revised Uniform Partnership
Act, enacted in 1998, created a new general power of partners to dissociate without causing
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dissolution of the partnership, Idaho Code § 53-3-602(a), and made that power retroactively
applicable to all existing partnerships, id § 53-3-l 204(b). The court reasoned that this 1998
power to dissociate was limited by an "express provision" of the 1985 agreement and that the
dissociation was thus "wrongful" under Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(l). In so holding, the district
court misunderstood both the impact ofRUPA's retroactive changes to the background rules
governing Idaho partnerships, and the sort of "express provision" necessary to render "wrongful"
the exercise ofRUPA's later-granted statutory rights. 4
1.

The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Fundamentally Altered Idaho
Law By Retroactively Allowing All Partners To Dissociate Without
Causing Dissolution Of The Partnership, And Letting Partnerships
Adopt An "Express Provision" Of The Partnership Agreement
Making Such Dissociation A Breach Of Contract

In I 998, the Idaho legislature adopted RUP A and, effective July l, 200 l, retroactively
applied it to "all partnerships" existing at the time of enactment. Idaho Code § 53-3- l 204(b ). As
this Court recently noted, "RUPA dramatically change[d] [the] aspect of partnership law"
dealing with the essential legal structure of the partnership and the consequences of a partner's
departure. Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, l 79 P.3d 316, 319-20 (2008). Before RUPA, under
the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), partnerships were entities defined by the particular
aggregation of individual partners. See id; Idaho Code§§ 53-329, -330, -33 l (repealed effective
July 1, 2001 ); Paul Powell, Comment, Dissociating the Fiduciary: Duty Revisions and the

Resulting Confusion in Idaho's New Partnership Law, 36 Idaho L. Rev. 145, 147 & n. l 4 (l 999).
4

As explained below in Part LC, the district court also erred in allowing the jury to consider
MRJA's alternative theory that Saint Alphonsus wrongfully dissociated in violation of a definite
term of years.
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As a result, a single partner's departure caused the original legal entity to dissolve, even where
such departure violated a provision of the contract (in which event the departure and resulting
dissolution would be remediable in damages). See Idaho Code§ 53-33l(l)(b), (2) (repealed
effective July I, 2001) ("Dissolution is caused [either consistent with the partnership agreement
or in contravention of it] by the express will of any partner at any time.").
The drafters of RUPA deemed this state of affairs intolerable, because the UPA rule "that
a partnership is dissolved every time a member leaves" "fail[ed] to recognize the stability of
many partnerships." Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform Partnership

Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. Law. 1, 5 (1993). Thus, to enhance the legal and
practical continuity of partnerships, RUPA provides that "[a] partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners," Idaho Code§ 53-3-201, and that every "partner can be dissociated from a
partnership without causing the dissolution of the partnership or requiring the winding up of its
affairs." Costa, 179 P.3d at 320; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership

Act: Not Ready For Prime Time, 49 Bus. Law. 45, 62 (1993) ("The UPA provides that any
partner dissociation causes dissolution .... RUPA Articles 6, 7, and 8 appear to change this by
clearly separating partner dissociation and dissolution .... ").
Because the ability of partners to dissociate without causing dissolution of a partnership
was essential to the RUPA drafters' concept of partnerships as continuous entities transcending
the make-up of their members, that power is enshrined in§ 53-3-103(b)(6) as one of the ten basic
features of a partnership that cannot be altered by agreement of the partners. See id ("[t]he
partnership agreement may not: ... [v]ary the power to dissociate as a partner under section 53-
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3-602(a), Idaho Code, except to require [written notice of dissociation]"). This fundamental
change in partnership law, which allowed any partner to leave the partnership without causing it
to dissolve, effectively amended all existing partnership agreements and altered the expectations
of the parties as they existed at the time of execution. After RUPA's effective date, any partner
could dissociate simply by giving notice to the partnership of that partner's "express will" to do
so. Id.§§ 53-3-601(1), -602(a).
At the same time, though, RUP A allows partners to agree that such a dissociation would
be "wrongful" by, among other things, including an "express provision of the partnership
agreement" making dissociation a breach of contract. Id. § 53-3-602(b ). RUP A thus created a
legal framework in which partners could come and go at will from a continuing partnership
entity, while providing that"[ a] partner who wrongfully dissociates [in breach of an express
provision of the agreement] is liable to the partnership and to the other partners for damages
caused by the dissociation." Id. § 53-3-602(c).
There is no dispute among the parties or the district court that these RUP A provisions,
which revolutionized the nature and continuity of partnerships, were made retroactively
applicable to all existing partnerships, including MRIA, notwithstanding that its partnership
agreement was executed in 1985 and Idaho's RUPA was not enacted until 1998. Id. § 53-31204(b). The statute's retroactive application only became effective, however, after "a transition
period [ending July 1, 2001] .... [t]hat afford[ed] existing partnerships and partners an
opportunity to consider the changes effected by RUPA and to amend their partnership
agreements, if appropriate." Idaho Code§ 53-3-1204, official cmt.

- 19 -

2.

Section 6.1 Of The 1985 Partnership Agreement Is Not An "Express
Provision" That Makes Wrongful Any Exercise Of The Power To
Dissociate Conferred By RUPA In 1998

The district court concluded that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation violated an "express
provision" of the partnership agreement, namely Section 6.1. That provision states:
6.1
Conditions for Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may
withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital
Partner's reasonable judgment, continued participation in this
partnership: (i) jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital
Partner or its parent or its subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes
Medicare/Medicaid or insurance reimbursements or participations;
(iii) if the business activities of the Partnership are contrary to the
ethical principles of the Roman Catholic Church as designated
from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of any local,
state or federal laws, rules or regulations.
(App. 4 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 6.1).)5 The district court reasoned that this section's "may
withdraw ... if' language necessarily reflected an expectation that withdrawal would be limited
to the four enumerated circumstances, and that Section 6.1 is therefore an "express provision"
making Saint Alphonsus's dissociation under RUPA a breach of contract. (R., Vol. ll, pp. 39495.) This is wrong.

An "express" provision is one that is "' [c]!ear; definite; explicit; plain; direct;
unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and
distinctly stated. Made known distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference.'" Sweeney v.
Otter, 119 Idaho 135,140,804 P.2d 308,313 (1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.
1990)); see also V Oxford English Dictionary 582 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "express," when
5

The agreement defines "Hospital Partner" as including Saint Alphonsus and the other
hospitals, but not DMR. (App. 2 (Trial Ex. 4023 § 1.3.3).)
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referring to a "meaning, purpose, stipulation, law, etc." as one that is "not merely implied;
definitively formulated; definite, [or] explicit"). An "express provision" making it a breach of
contract to exercise the RUPA-conferred power to dissociate without causing dissolution must
therefore do so affirmatively and unambiguously, without resort to inferences or speculation
about what the parties might have intended.
Section 6. l is not such an "express provision" because it says nothing at all about the
parties' intentions regarding the RUPA power to dissociate without causing dissolution. Most
fundamentally, Section 6. l does not mention or address "dissociation" at all. How could it, since
the power to dissociate without causing dissolution of the partnership was an entirely new
concept that did not exist when Section 6.1 was written in 1985? That power was created by
RUP A in l 998 and made retroactively applicable to existing partnerships in 2001. Without a
crystal ball to foretell RUPA's change in the law, there is no way that the parties in I 985 could
have included a provision addressing whether exercise of the RUP A power to dissociate while
leaving the partnership intact was or was not a breach of contract.
In addition, the language of Section 6.1 is entirely permissive. It provides that a hospital
partner "may withdraw" under certain conditions, but does not expressly limit or restrict anything.
It certainly does not, as the district court effectively held, expressly reject any and all subsequent
legislative modifications of a partner's right to leave the partnership.
Beyond the fact that Section 6.1 is not an "express" limitation of any sort, it also does not
support any inference about how the parties would have regarded the new RUP A power to
dissociate without dissolving the existing partnership, had they somehow thought to consider it
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in 1985. That is because Section 6.1 was adopted against a UPA background rule that did not
contain any notion of partnership "withdrawal." Rather, under UPA, a single partner's decision
to leave the partnership would cause its dissolution. In that context, Section 6.1 was solely an
affirmative grant to the hospital partners of a contractual right to "withdraw" for specified urgent

reasons relating to the hospital partners' legal and ethical duties. That provision was coupled
with provisions in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 that would avoid a forced liquidation of partnership
assets, provide a defined and limited payout of the withdrawing partner's interests, and facilitate
continued operation of the business. (See Exhibit to R. #8, pp. 8-9; Exhibit to R. # 15, pp. 5-7;
Exhibit to R. #23, pp. 4-9.) Section 6.1, in other words, was included as a safety valve to provide
a contractual mechanism to meet the parties' needs within the legal framework as it existed in
1985. The provision's permissive "may withdraw ... if' language is thus an assurance to the
hospitals of minimum withdrawal rights that were essential to them. It says nothing about how
the parties would regard rights granted by a future law to dissociate without causing dissolution. 6

6

The district court's error in reading this pre-existing contractual provision as an "express"
limitation of the subsequently enacted RUP A right is illustrated by cases from other jurisdictions
that have adopted RUP A. In Warnick v. Warnick, 76 P.3d 316 (Wyo. 2003), for example, the
court addressed an agreement that contained express terms governing liquidation of the
partnership, but-since the concept did not exist when the agreement was made-was "silent as
to dissociation." Id at 318, 322. Explaining that "RUP A dramatically change[ d] the law
governing partnership breakups and dissolution" by creating an "entirely new concept,
'dissociation,"' id at 321 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the court concluded
that a partner's expression of his desire to withdraw from the partnership was governed by
RUPA's default provisions for the buyout of a dissociating partner, rather than by the
agreement's express provisions for liquidation. Id at 322.
Similarly, in McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697 (Mont. 2004), a partner in a UPA-era
partnership sought to rely on UPA-era case law in an effort to obtain a buyout in lieu of
liquidation following a judicial dissolution of the partnership. Id at 703-05. The court rejected
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The conclusion that Section 6.1 is not an "express provision" limiting RUPA's general
right of dissociation is even clearer when one considers the rights granted by RUP A to DMR, the
consortium of doctors that partnered with the hospitals to form MRIA. As a safety valve
responsive to the unique needs of Saint Alphonsus and the other hospitals, Section 6.1, by its
terms, applies only to the "Hospital Partner[s]," and not to DMR. Indeed, Section 6.1 says
nothing at all about DMR. Thus: (i) when the partnership was first formed, DMR had no ability
to withdraw or otherwise leave the partnership without causing its dissolution; (ii) effective July
1, 200 I, RUPA retroactively gave DMR the power to dissociate while leaving the partnership
intact; and (iii) Section 6.1 obviously does not restrict DMR 's RUPA-granted ability to dissociate
in the way the district court held that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation rights were limited. But
Section 6.1 was written as an unambiguous grant to the hospital partners of more favorable
withdrawal rights than were given to their partner DMR, and imposed no limitation at all. To
now read Section 6.1 as giving the hospital partners a less favorable right to dissociate than
DMR now has under RUP A is incongruous and contrary to anything the parties ever intended. It
is easily avoided by recognizing that RUPA gave all partners the power to dissociate without
causing dissolution, and no amendment to the agreement-no "express provision"-was ever
adopted to make its exercise a breach of contract under any circumstance.
(continued ... )

these cases, however, because "[ u]nlike the UP A, RUPA now provides two separate tracks for
the exiting partner"---dissociation and dissolution-and specifically requires liquidation in cases
of dissolution by judicial decree. Id. The court thus applied the new legal framework created by
RUPA to a preexisting partnership, even though the consequence was to alter the outcome that
would have been contemplated by the parties when the partnership agreement was executed.
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In holding otherwise, the district court reasoned that, when the partnership agreement was
signed, the parties did not expect that Saint Alphonsus and the other hospitals would be able to
withdraw from the partnership except for the reasons enumerated in Section 6.1. (Neither, of
course, did they believe DMR had any withdrawal rights.) But these facts are beside the point,
precisely because RUP A made retroactive its fundamental changes in partnership law and thus
effectively amended the 1985 agreement contract and altered the expectations of the parties.
Indeed, RUPA's retroactive change in the nature of partnerships was made with full knowledge
that "[i]n a number of key areas, the Revised Act contains substantive changes in partnership law
that directly undo the historical bargains incorporated into existing partnership agreements."
Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of I 994 Really Be Retroactive?,
50 Bus. Law. 267,274 (I 994). "Because ofth[is] retroactive application," it was understood that
a party could be "left with a set of partnership termination provisions far different from those
upon which he counted at the inception of the partnership," including a right to "dissociate from
the partnership--a concept and term new to partnership law." Allan W. Vestal, "Wide Open":

Nevada's Innovative Market in Partnership Law, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 275, 278 (2006).
The legislature chose to account for these effects not by giving courts the power to
mitigate them by finding "express provisions" where there are none, but rather by providing the
parties to existing partnerships with a three-year grace period during which they could amend
their agreements to adjust to some of these changes, including by expressly making specified
acts of dissociation an actionable breach of contract. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-1204(b)-(c); supra
p. 19. Critically, however, the MRIA partners let this opportunity pass, and have adopted no
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amendments to limit or qualify any of the new rules RUPA retroactively made applicable to
MRIA. In particular, they never amended their agreement to provide that a partner's exercise of
the newly created power to dissociate without causing dissolution would constitute a breach of
contract.
In sum, the Idaho legislature conferred on all partners in existing partnerships a power to
dissociate without causing dissolution, and, at the same time, allowed such partnerships to adopt
an "express provision" making such dissociation a breach of contract. The court below erred in
concluding that Section 6.1 of the 1985 agreement is such a provision. It should instead have
held that no such express provision exists and accordingly entered summary judgment for Saint
Alphonsus on MRIA's claim for wrongful dissociation. 7

B.

Communication To The Jury Of The Court's Erroneous Summary
Judgment Ruling Prejudiced The Jury's Consideration Of The Entire Case

The district court's erroneous holding on summary judgment that Saint Alphonsus
"wrongfully" dissociated from the partnership, coupled with its subsequent denial of Saint
Alphonsus's motions to prohibit MRIA from referring to that holding during trial or otherwise to
clarify the holding's import, prevented Saint Alphonsus from having a fair trial on MRIA's other
claims. These rulings enabled MRIA's counsel to repeatedly trumpet to the jury-as the
centerpiece ofMRIA's case-the court's pre-trial ruling binding the jury to the conclusion that
Saint Alphonsus had acted "wrongfully" towards MRIA. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. I, p. 616, L. 15-17;
id. p. 922, L. 9-24; id. p. 997, L. 21 top. 998, L. 1; id. p. 998, L. 19-21; id. p. 1044, L. 15- 18; Tr.,
7

Even if there were ambiguity about the meaning of Section 6. 1, the court should have
submitted this question to the jury rather than decided it in favor of MRIA on summary judgment.
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Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 1-12.) This made it impossible from the very beginning of the trial for the
jury to fairly and impartially consider MRIA's remaining claims. The court's instructions to the
jury that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was wrongful also amounted to a directed verdict on
critical elements of the remaining claims, and thus all but eliminated the possibility of verdicts
for Saint Alphonsus on these other claims. This crippling prejudice requires the remaining
verdicts to be set aside and a new trial granted.
Rule 59(a) of the Idabo Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the grant of a new trial
based on any "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any order of
the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial" or
an "[e]rror in law, occurring at the trial." l.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (7). This is true regardless of the
court's view of the likelihood ofa different outcome upon retrial, so long as any party was
"deprived ... of a fair trial." Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d 857, 863 (2000);

see also Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 262, 805 P.2d 452, 468 (1991 ). Moreover, "where
prejudicial errors oflaw have occurred at the trial," the court has a "duty to grant a new trial"
even if"the verdict is supported by substantial evidence." Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found,

Inc., 130 Idaho 400,405,941 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1997) (emphasis added; citation and quotation
marks omitted); accord 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2805
(2d ed. 1995) ("[aJny error oflaw, if prejudicial, is a good ground for a new trial"). The test for
prejudice requiring a new trial is "whether the [improperly admitted] information reasonably

could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in light of all the events and evidence at trial."
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Dach/et v. State, 136 ldaho 752, 760, 40 P.3d 110, 118 (2002) (emphasis added; citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The test for prejudice under Rule 59(a) is met here. As a general matter, the
communication to the jury of an incorrect summary-judgment ruling on one theory of liability
obviously has the potential to result in severe prejudice as to claims tried to the jury. The case of

Steele v. Kelley, 710 N.E.2d 973 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999), is instructive. In Steele, the trial court
had erroneously failed to dismiss one of the plaintiff's claims, on which the jury subsequently
found liability. See id at 984-85. This error, of course, required the appellate court to order
judgment for the defendant on that specific claim. But "[t]he impact of the judge's error with
respect to th[at] count was not confined ... to an improper resolution of that discrete claim." Id
at 985. Rather, "by focusing the jury's attention on" issues that should not have been before it,
the improper submission of the claim "effectively tainted the whole case against [the
defendant]." Id Not only that, but the "taint of this fundamental error over the entire proceeding
was spread by [the plaintiff's] attorney," who focused on the improper claim in her closing
argument, and the "contamination" was made "decisive" by "the judge's charge" to the jury to
focus on the elements of that claim. Id The legal error with respect to the one cause of action
therefore ''.justifies reversal of the entire judgment ... and the allowance of a new trial." Id;

accord 2200 Commercial St. Warehousing, L.L.C. v. Hastings Dev. Co., 255 S.W.3d 488,490
(Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that "erroneous grant of summary judgment" on certain claims
"tainted" the findings made at subsequent trial and therefore required a new trial).

C
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Here, even more clearly than in Steele, the district court's legal error in concluding that
Saint Alphonsus had "wrongfully" dissociated-along with MRIA's opportunistic use of that
error to bias the jury against Saint Alphonsus--created prejudice requiring a new trial on all
other claims. Unlike the error in Steele, which simply allowed an invalid claim to be heard by
the jury, the district court in this case informed the jury that the defendant was liable on a
meritless claim. Indeed, the court's holding was the very heart ofMRIA's trial strategy on its
remaining claims, pursuant to which MRIA sought to portray Saint Alphonsus as a courtadjudicated wrongdoer and Saint Alphonsus's "wrongful" dissociation as the culmination of a
scheme, begun years earlier, to "betray" MRIA. See supra pp. 10-11. This strategy began with

voir dire, continued through MRIA's opening statement, infected the testimony of key witnesses,
and culminated in counsel's closing argument. See supra pp. 10-11. These mischaracterizations
were backed by the authority of the district court, which not only instructed the jury that it had
already determined that Saint Alphonsus had dissociated "wrongfully" (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4271, L.
4-11), but also denied Saint Alphonsus's request to explain to the jury that a "wrongful
dissociation" is not necessarily illegal or blameworthy, see Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc.,
841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[e]ven if the breach is deliberate, it is not necessarily
blameworthy"). (Tr., Vol. III, pp. 3960-62.)
The message that Saint Alphonsus was an adjudicated wrongdoer also made it possible
for MRIA to discredit testimony that Saint Alphonsus had dealt with MRIA in good faith and
had made generous concessions to MRIA when it attempted to negotiate a deal that would have
involved MRIA in the operations of!MI or otherwise resolved the parties' impasse. (See, e.g.,
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Tr., Vol. III, p. 3809, L. 17 top. 3822, L. 4; id. p. 4014, L. 15 top. 4026, L. 11.) Having already
been told that Saint Alphonsus had no right to leave the partnership, the jury quite naturally
accepted MRIA's competing characterization of these negotiations as a bad-faith sham. (See,

e.g., Tr., Vol. III, p. 4307, L. 2-23; id. p. 4321, L. 10-25.) MRIA also used the court's holding to
undermine the general credibility of Saint Alphonsus' s witnesses, such as CEO Sandra Bruce,
whom it mocked in closing argument on the ground that she "thought lt was okay" for Saint
Alphonsus to withdraw from the partnership. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. III, p. 4317, L. 10-19.) 8
As a result, for the jury, the question of liability on MRIA 's other claims was never more

than an afterthought. This alone requires a new trial, but there is even more prejudice here. In
light of the admonition that Saint Alphonsus had "wrongfully" breached the partnership
agreement, the court's instructions on those other claims were effectively tautological and
virtually compelled the jury to find liability. Specifically:

•

On MRIA 's claim for wrongful dissociation in breach of a partnership term, the
jury was asked to find whether Saint Alphonsus had "breached" the partnership
agreement "by dissociating" before the end of the alleged partnership term (Tr.,
Vol. III, p. 4275), after having already been told that the court had already
determined that the dissociation was wrongful and a breach.

•

On MRIA's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
jury was instructed that Saint Alphonsus was liable if "[a]ction by Saint
Alphonsus violated ... the contract." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4278, L. 1-14.) Obviously,
no reasonable juror could think that a dissociation that was a "wrongful" breach
of the partnership agreement did not also "violat[e] ... the contract."

8

This trial tactic was especially effective because MRIA also relied on erroneously admitted
privileged legal advice to argue that counsel had advised Saint Alphonsus beforehand that
withdrawal was wrongful. See infra Part II.A.
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•

In connection with MRIA's claim for breach of the partnership agreement's noncompete clause, MRIA's counsel and witnesses told the jury that Saint
Alphonsus's wrongful dissociation necessarily gave rise to a breach of that clause.
(See Tr., Vol. II, p. 1875, L. 11-14 ("if withdrawal is wrongful, then Saint
Alphonsus cannot compete"); id p. 2221, L. 24 to p. 2222, L. 1 ("[iJf you
withdraw wrongfully, my understanding is that your noncompete [obligation]
would be for the period of the Partnership Agreement").)

•

On the claims for breach of fiduciary duty, the jury was instructed that Saint
Alphonsus was liable if it failed "to act primarily for the benefie' of MRIA and
the limited partnerships or if it "act[ed] adversely to the partnership." (Tr., Vol.
III, p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4283, L. 10.) A party who willfully breached the contract
by its withdrawal would obviously violate these standards as well. Indeed,
MRIA's counsel argued that legal advice given to Saint Alphonsus gave it
advance notice of that fact. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 3594, L. 9 top. 3596, L. 3; see also
Tr., Vol. II, p. I 876, L. 13-16.)

•

On MRIA's claim for civil conspiracy, the jury was instructed to find liability if
Saint Alphonsus had agreed "[t]o accomplish an 'unlawful' objective or
accomplish a lawful objective through 'unlawful means,"' and was told that the
"essence" of a civil conspiracy is a "civil wrong." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4283, L. 16 to
p. 4284, L. 11.) Without Saint Alphonsus being allowed to explain that
"wrongful" dissociation was not equivalent to an "unlawful" act, the jury had the
court's ruling as proof of this element of civil conspiracy. Indeed, the jury would
plainly understand a ''wrongful" dissociation to be a civil "wrong."

•

On MRIA's claim that Saint Alphonsus tortiously interfered with prospective
contractual relations, the jury was instructed to find Saint Alphonsus liable if the
interference was "wrongful." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4280, L. 11 top. 4281, L. 1 l.) Of
course, the jury had already been reminded over and over again that Saint
Alphonsus' s dissociation--one of the acts allegedly interfering with MRIA' s
prospective relations-had already been held to be "wrongful."

In short, on each one of the remaining claims, the jury was led to believe that the court's
prior ruling on wrongful dissociation was a sufficient predicate for finding liability. Indeed, the
fact that the jury returned a verdict for MRIA on each one of its claims in this complex case in
just ninety minutes demonstrates the prejudicial sway that the court's ruling on wrongful
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dissociation held over the jury. Because that ruling was incorrect as a matter of law, Saint
Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial on all of MRIA' s other claims.
C.

The Grant Of Summary Judgment Cannot Be Justified On The Alternative
Ground That Saint Alphonsus Dissociated Before The Expiration Of A
Definite Term Of Years

A partner's exercise of its RUPA power to dissociate without causing dissolution is
wrongful not only if it is in breach of an express provision of the partnership agreement, but also
if the partnership is "for a definite term," and the dissociation occurs "before the expiration of
the term." Idaho Code§ 53-3-602(b)(2). 9 MRIA claimed that the partnership agreement here
was for a definite term, but cited no provision of the agreement to support that assertion. Instead,
MRIA argued that other agreements between different entities-Center's and Mobile's limited
partnership agreements and Center's September 1985 building lease-had fixed terms and raised
an issue of fact whether the MRIA partnership agreement also had a fixed term. (Exhibit to R.
#11, pp. 14-15; R., Vol. XII p. 2390-91.) Submitting this issue to the jury was error. 10 The
MRIA partnership agreement, in a section entitled "Effective Date and Term," expressly
addresses the term of the partnership in a manner that, as a matter of law, renders the term
indefinite. The parol evidence rule bars admission of extrinsic evidence to modify this provision.
"To find that [a] partnership is formed for a definite term ... there must be clear evidence
of an agreement among the partners that the partnership ... has a minimum or maximum
9

Dissociation is also wrongful if the partnership is for a "particular undertaking" and the
dissociation occurs before the undertaking is complete, id., but such a theory was not submitted
to the jury in this case.
·
10

Saint Alphonsus unsuccessfully moved for both summary judgment (Exhibit to R. #8, pp.
14-16) and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Exhibit to R. # 208, pp. 31-33) on this issue.
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duration .... " Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 cmt. In contrast, a partnership has an indefinite term if
the parties agree that the partnership will continue until an uncertain future date, i.e., if they
"have not agreed to remain partners until the expiration ofa definite term." Id. § 53-3-101(10).
Such a partnership that "may last indefinitely" is for an indefinite term, moreover, "even though
there may be an obligation of the partnership, such as a mortgage, which must be repaid by a
certain date, absent a specific agreement that no partner can rightfully withdraw until the
obligation is repaid." Id. § 53-3-101 cmt.
Applying these principles, courts have consistently focused on express contractual
language and concluded, for example, that a partnership is for an indefinite term as a matter of
law where the partnership agreement provided that the partnership "shall continue until dissolved
either by mutual agreement or by operation of law," Courdy v. Paycom Billing Servs., Inc.,
No. B162421, 2006 WL 847212, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2006), or where the agreement
provided that a partnership to operate a parcel of real property shall "continue until the real
property is sold," Harshman v. Pantaleoni, 741 N.Y.S.2d 348,349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). In an
analogous context, this Court, too, has recognized that a contract is not for "a definite term of
duration" where it provides for contractual obligations to continue "as long as" certain
circumstances exist. Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856-57, 979
P.2d 1207, 1214-15 (1999) (applying statute of frauds).
Here, similarly, the MRIA partnership agreement expressly and unambiguously sets an
indefinite term. Section 1.1. of the agreement governs its "Effective Date and Term," and
Section 1.1.2 provides that, in the event certain formative steps were completed by a set date, as
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they were here, "then the term of this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a
reasonable time after the business of the Partnership is wound up and dissolved under Article
IO." (App. I (Trial Ex. 4023, §§ 1.1, 1.1.2).) The agreement provides, in other words, that after
December 31, 1985, the partnership shall last until the partners decide to end it at any time. Like
the "as long as" language of General Auto Parts and the "shall continue until dissolved"
language of Courdy, the "shall end [when] ... wound up and dissolved" language of Section
1. 1.2 embodies an agreement to leave open-ended the duration of the partnership. This is so,
moreover, "even though there may be an obligation," such as Center's lease, that itself has a
defined term. Idaho Code§ 53-3-101 cmt. Saint Alphonsus thus did not wrongfully dissociate
"before the expiration of' a "definite term."
MRIA argued below that the contract's language was capable of being supplemented by
extrinsic evidence purporting to show that the parties intended MRIA's partnership term to be
defined by the allegedly fixed terms of the Center and Mobile limited partnership agreements
and Center's building lease, thus making the partnership term a question of fact for the jury.
(Exhibit to R. #11, pp. 12-15 (citing a treatise and a number of pre-RUPA cases from various
jurisdictions).) But such a claim is directly at odds with the parol evidence rule, which provides
that "when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement
of their agreement, evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings
which relate to the same subject matter is not admissible to vary, contradict, or enlarge the terms
of the written contract." Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000). The
MRIA partnership agreement was just such "a writing that the parties intend[ ed] to be a final
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statement of their agreement." The parol evidence rule is therefore applicable to it, and thus bars
consideration of the evidence relied upon by MRIA. 11
The authorities cited by MRIA below to support the use of extrinsic evidence to modify
contract provisions (see Exhibit to R. # 11, pp. 12-15) are wholly unavailing. All of the cited
cases arise in situations where there was no "written contract" of the sort that "the parties [would
have] intend[ed] to be a final statement of their agreement," Simons, 134 Idaho at 828, 11 P.3d at
24, and thus the parol evidence rule excluding such evidence did not apply. A majority of the
cited cases involved an agreement that was entirely oral. 12 The others involved a written
agreement that was completely silent on the issue of the partnership's durational term, thus
leaving wholly unaddressed the parties' intentions on that essential point. 13 These cases thus
stand only for the unexceptional proposition that extrinsic evidence of parties' contractual

11

The separate lease and limited partnership agreements likewise are not admissible as
subsequent oral modifications of the terms of the MRIA partnership agreement. The MRIA
partnership agreement allows amendment "only through written instrument [sic J executed by all
the Partners." (App. 6 (Trial Ex. 4023, § 12.1).) The lease and limited partnership agreements,
however, were executed by a different collection of investor parties for entirely different reasons.
See supra note 2.
12

Owenv. Cohen, 119P.2d 713 (Cal. 1941);Zeibakv. Nasser, 82 P.2d375, 381 (Cal. 1938);
Meherin v. Meherin, 209 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S. 489,
490 (1913); 68th St. Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78, 80 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
13

Vangel v. Vangel, 254 P.2d 919,925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (noting that "the agreement does
not mention the term of the partnership"); Shannon v. Hudson, 325 P.2d I 022, I 023 & n. I (Cal.
Ct. App. 1958) (informal written agreement with no specific mention of a term); Drashner v.
Sorenson, 63 N.W.2d 255, 257-58 (S.D. 1954) (no specific mention of term); Pemberton v.
Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 180 S.W.2d 766, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) ("no express stipulation
as to the duration of the partnership agreement").
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intentions is admissible where the predicate for the parol evidence rule-an integrated writing
intended as a final statement of the agreement-is missing.

14

In sum, where, as here, a written partnership agreement expressly defines "the term of
this Partnership" as ending at an indefinite point in the future, resort to extrinsic evidence to set a
definite term of the partnership is prohibited. For these reasons, the MRIA partnership
agreement lacked a definite term, and the district court's entry of judgment on the claim of
wrongful dissociation cannot be affirmed on the alternative theory that dissociation occurred
before the expiration of a definite term. Rather, the district court should have granted summary
judgment to Saint Alphonsus on this claim. 15

14

Careful adherence to the parol evidence rule, excluding evidence which might supplement
terms of a complete written partnership agreement, is especially important following the
adoption ofRUPA in 1998. As explained above, RUPA radically (and retroactively) redefined
the nature of partnerships, so that a partnership no longer depends strictly on the continuity of a
specific collection of individuals, but instead is a continuing entity made up of partners who may
come and go. See supra pp. 17-19. The implication of partnership terms based on oral
understandings outside the four corners of a partnership agreement would be entirely unworkable
under this "entity" theory of partnership, because any oral understandings that may exist between
the original partners cannot fairly or practically be imposed on late joiners with no notice of them.
See Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho
539,548,916 P.2d 1264, 1273 (1996) (party's "contractual rights ... [may] not be taken away
by a contract between [different parties]"). And it is plainly unworkable for a partnership to
have a definite term with respect to some partners, but not others.
15

Even if the durational term of the partnership agreement were properly a question of fact
for the jury, Saint Alphonsus would still be entitled to a new trial on that issue based on the
prejudicial effects of the district court's erroneous grant of summary judgment for MRIA on the
claim for wrongful dissociation. See supra Part LB.
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II.

THE ADMISSION OF TWO PIECES OF INADMISSIBLE, MISLEADING, AND
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRES A NEW
TRIAL.
The severe prejudice suffered by Saint Alphonsus as a result of the court's erroneous

entry of summary judgment on the wrongful dissociation claim was compounded by the court's
improper admission of two highly significant pieces of evidence-a memorandum containing
privileged attorney-client communications and an offer of settlement. The district court
permitted MRIA to use this evidence to argue, misleadingly and prejudicially, that Saint
Alphonsus had acted in bad faith in its dealings with MRIA. Separately and together with the
court's ruling on wrongful dissociation, these evidentiary errors entitle Saint Alphonsus to a new
trial.
A.

Privileged Attorney-Client Communications Summarized In The Shattuck
Hammond Memorandum Were Erroneously Admitted And Relied Upon To
Argue That Saint Alphonsus Acted In Bad Faith

The district court erred when it admitted into evidence, after denying Saint Alphonsus's
motions in limine to exclude it, 16 a summary of legal advice of Saint Alphonsus's retained
counsel, Givens Pursley, that "there would likely be litigation" if Saint Alphonsus dissociated
from MRIA and that "there may be a risk of Saint Alphonsus breaching" a fiduciary duty if it did

16

Saint Alphonsus twice moved prior to trial to exclude this evidence as protected by the
attorney-client privilege (see Exhibit to R. #54, pp. 5-12; Exhibit to R. # 131, p. 5), and moved
again after the verdict for a new trial based on the improper admission of this evidence (see
Exhibit to R. #208, pp. 17-20). The district court denied all three motions. (See R., Vol. V, pp.
848-50; R., Vol. XI, pp. 2116-18; R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2439-41.)
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so. (App. 34 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 11).) 17 This privileged communication was memorialized in an
internal memorandum prepared by two junior associates at the investment banking firm Shattuck
Hammond, which had been retained by Givens Pursley in 2001 to "act as a consultant" to the law
firm in connection with its representation of Saint Alphonsus in "evaluating what legal rights or
options Saint Alphonsus may have with respect to its partnership interest." (Confidential Exhibit
to R. #4, at Ex. A.) 18 At trial, MRIA repeatedly used Givens Pursley's assessment that litigation
was "likely" in the event of dissociation to portray Saint Alphonsus as an intentional wrongdoer
indifferent to its legal obligations and the rights of MRIA. Such misuse of privileged legal
advice is clearly prejudicial and therefore warrants a new trial.
Rule 502 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence extends the attorney-client privilege to
"confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client." l.R.E. 502(b ). The Rule protects not only direct communications
between a client and its counsel, but also communications "between the client's lawyer and the
lawyer's representative." l.R.E. 502(b)(2).

17

The memorandum containing these opinions states that Saint Alphonsus "has been advised
by counsel that this option [withdrawing from the partnership) would likely engender litigation
with MRIA" (App. 33 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 2)), and explains that "Givens Pursley believes that
there would likely be litigation as to whether the termination was wrongful and that there may be
a risk of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary responsibility to the LPs" (App. 34 (Trial Ex.
4239, p. 11)). An earlier version of the memorandum with identical language was also admitted
at trial. (See Trial Ex. 4234, pp. 2, 8.)
18

The retention letter provided that Shattuck Hammond would "be in direct contact with
representatives of Saint Alphonsus," but that "any conclusions, preliminary or final, will be
addressed to [Givens Pursley) and used by th[e] firm in connection with th[e) firm's rendering of
legal advice to Saint Alphonsus." (Id.)
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As an assessment of the litigation and liability risks of alternative courses of action
available to Saint Alphonsus, the legal advice described in the memorandum plainly constitutes
the rendition of legal services by Givens Pursley to Saint Alphonsus. As noted in the
memorandum, Shattuck Hammond had "reviewed [Saint Alphonsus's options) with Givens
Pursley" in order to obtain Givens Pursley' s "thoughts on the potential litigation involved with
each alternative." (App. 34 (Trial Ex. 4239, p. 11).) The communication of this legal advice
"between" Givens Pursley ("the client's lawyer") and Shattuck Hammond ("the lawyer's
representative") about the litigation risks of various courses of action is privileged by the plain
terms of Rule 502(b)(2). 19
The district court refused to exclude the statement because it was embodied not in a
memorandum from Givens Pursley to Shattuck Hammond (or vice versa), but rather appeared
within an internal Shattuck Hammond document circulated among Shattuck Hammond
employees. (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2439-41.) In doing so, the district court misconceived the rules of
privilege. It is well-settled that writings memorializing privileged communications, as well as
communications about the privileged communications among attorneys or representatives, are
"entitled to the same degree of protection from disclosure" as the original communications
between attorneys and clients (or their respective representatives). Natta v. Zietz, 418 F.2d 633,

637 n.3 (7th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. DeFonte, 441 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 2006)
19

MRIA has suggested that privilege should not apply because Shattuck Hammond was
actually acting as Saint Alphonsus's representative. But Rule 502(b)(l) also privileges
communications "between the ... client's representative and the client's lawyer." As a result,
even on MRIA's view, the sharing of legal advice by Givens Pursley ("the client's lawyer") with
Shattuck Hammond ("the client's representative") would fall within the plain terms of Rule 502.
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("memorializations of [privileged] conversations ... are protected from disclosure by the
attorney-client privilege"); Alexander v. FBI, l 86 F.R.D. 154, 161 (D.D.C. l 999) ("[T]he
attorney-client privilege applies to [writings] that describe communications from attorneys or are
based on such communications. This principle has been followed by each court to have
addressed this matter." (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one court has explained, a
contrary rule would "penalize[) those" who write or consult with others in their firms and "would
make a mockery of both the privilege and the realities of current legal assistance." Natta,
418 F.2d at 63 7 n.3. Here, Shattuck Hammond recorded in a confidential internal writing both
Givens Pursley's privileged communications with Saint Alphonsus and Shattuck Hammond's
own privileged communication with Givens Pursley. This did not strip the communications of
their privileged nature, and the court therefore erred when it admitted these portions of the
memorandum.
Finally, notwithstanding the district court's ruling after trial that admitting this evidence
(even if error) was harmless (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2440), there is no doubt that the admission of the
privileged portions of the memorandum prejudiced Saint Alphonsus. MRIA's counsel told the
jury that the Shattuck Hammond memorandum (referred to as the "Finnerty memo") was one of
"the most critical documents in the case." (Tr., Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 20.) Even though Givens
Pursley had simply offered advice about litigation risks, and had not concluded that withdrawal
was in fact wrongful, MRIA's counsel repeatedly used Givens Pursley's opinion to underscore
the "wrongful" nature of Saint Alphonsus's conduct, undermine the credibility of Saint
Alphonsus's witnesses and excoriate Saint Alphonsus and its officers (including CEO Sandra
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Bruce) for acting in bad faith and with indifference to counsel's advice and the hospital's legal
obligations. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. II, p. 1861, L. 21 top. 1866, L. I; Tr., Vol. II, p. 1874, L. 13 to
p. 1878, L. 16; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3593, L. 22 top. 3596, L. 8; Tr. Vol. III, p. 4302, L. 7-23; Tr., Vol.
III, p. 4317, L. 10-19; Tr. Vol. III,p. 4321, L. 10-18.) A lay juror would likely not have
understood that parties in a commercial context routinely seek and consider the opinions of
counsel regarding legal and appropriate conduct, and that the liability risks and potential for
litigation identified by counsel are not indicative of actual liability or fault. This error thus
enabled MRIA to substantially predispose the jury and the outcome against Saint Alphonsus. A
new trial is therefore required.
B.

A Settlement Letter Sent By MRIA Containing An Offer To Sell Its Interest
In Center At A Stated Price Was Erroneously Admitted And Relied Upon To
Justify Damages And To Argue That Saint Alphonsus Acted In Bad Faith

The district court also erred when it allowed MRIA to introduce into evidence a
confidential settlement offer made by MRIA to Saint Alphonsus. (See App. 45 (Trial Ex. 4332).)
The court admitted the evidence, over Saint Alphonsus's objection, for the "limited purpose" of
showing MRIA's "belief or their opinion as to what they felt the fair market [value] of the MRIA
partnership was." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1239, L. 9 top. 1246, L. 24; R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2441-42.)
The admission of this document was improper under Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, which categorically provides that settlement offers are "not admissible to prove
liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." l.R.E. 408; see also Idaho
First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 276 n.8, 824 P.2d 841, 851 n.8

(1991) (settlement offers "clearly inadmissible" to show bad faith in settlement bargaining). All
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agree that the letter is a settlement offer. It even bears the caption "CONFIDENTIAL
SETTLEMENT OFFER MADE PURSUANT TO I.R.E. 408." (App A45 (Trial Ex. 4332).)
The use to which the court permitted MRIA to put the letter falls squarely within the
Rule's prohibition on the admissibility of settlement offers to prove the "amount of' a party's
claim. MRIA contended at trial that the damages for Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from the
partnership should be measured by the price Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to purchase
Center's business. (R., Vol. IX, pp. 1693-94.) To prove that value, MRIA presented the
settlement letter as evidence corroborating the value of Center as established by third-party
Shattuck Hammond. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 1953, L. I top. 1956, L. 6; id. p. 2063, L. 20 top. 2064,
L. 17.) Relying in part on the settlement offer, the jury awarded such damages. This is precisely
what Rule 408 is meant to disallow.
The improper admission of the settlement letter prejudiced Saint Alphonsus, even beyond
its improper use to prove value. MRIA was able to use Saint Alphonsus's rejection of the offer
as evidence that Saint Alphonsus was purportedly negotiating in bad faith. Indeed, MRIA's
counsel emphasized in his closing argument that the settlement offer (and Saint Alphonsus's
rejection thereof) was "the telltale" sign of Saint Alphonsus's purported bad faith. (Tr., Vol. III,
at 4322:1-15; see also id. p. 4296, L. 11-20; id. p. 4390, L. 9-14.) This "admi[ssion] of
settlement negotiations between the parties, based on the claim that [one party] negotiated ... in
bad faith" is precisely the sort of use for which this Court has held settlement offers are "clearly
inadmissible." Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 276 n.8, 824 P.2d at 851 n.8. When
compounded with the district court's other prejudicial mistakes-allowing MRIA to tell the jury
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that Saint Alphonsus had ignored the advice of its attorneys and had already been adjudicated a
wrongdoer by the court-Saint Alphonsus stood no chance of having a fair trial. The crippling
prejudice caused by these errors, separately and in combination, requires a new trial.
III.

HOWEVER THIS COURT RESOL YES THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES, IT MUST REVERSE THE DAMAGES AW ARD FOR
MULTIPLE, INDEPENDENT REASONS
Apart from the previously described errors, no damages award could be sustained in any

event due to improper instructions and legally inadequate proof. 20
The award to MRIA of $36.3 million for "lost profits" must be reversed on multiple
grounds. First, the profits at issue were lost, if at all, by the limited partnerships, Center and/or
Mobile, which owned the MRI business, and not by MRIA, which received as its income much
more modest management fees for serving as the general partner of the limited partnerships. See

infra Part Ill.A. Second, this Court cannot ignore this incongruity and assume the award was
really intended for the limited partnerships, because such an inference is belied by the jury
verdict form and the law of fiduciary duty. See infra Part III.B. Third, the "lost profits"
damages award cannot be sustained in any event because MRIA failed to prove that Saint
Alphonsus caused all or any particular portion of the "lost scans" whose proceeds constitute the
jury award. See infra Part lll.C. Fourth, it was error for the district court to permit MRIA to

20

At trial, MRIA sought $27.3 million in "lost benefit of the bargain" damages for its claim of
wrongful dissociation, and in the alternative sought an award of $36.3 million in "lost profits"
damages for "all other theories ofliability." (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2350-52.) Although the jury
awarded the sum of both measures, MRIA conceded that they are duplicative and consented to a
remittitur fixing damages at the higher alternative of$36.3 million. (R.., Vol. XIII, at 2435.)
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introduce evidence of lost profits beyond December 31, 2015, the date on which the Center
partnership was set to expire. See infra Part II!.D.
Finally, if the award of $36.3 million for "lost profits" is set aside, it would be error to
substitute in its place the jury's alternative award of "purchase price" damages of $27.3 million.
This theory of damages for breach of contract finds no basis in the law and is unsupported by the
evidence. See infra Part III. E.

A.

The Award Of Lost Scan Profits To MRIA Cannot Stand Because MRIA
Had No Such Profits To Lose

It is indisputable that the award of $36.3 million in damages represents profits allegedly
lost by one or both of the limited partnerships, Center and Mobile. MRIA, which owns just a
fraction of Center and Mobile, therefore did not suffer these damages, and the jury award to
MRIA in its own name and on its own behalf was improper:
Center and Mobile are the two limited partnerships established by MRIA for the purpose
of engaging in the business of providing MRI services. See supra pp. 3-4. MRIA "provides no
services directly" (App. 37 (Trial Ex. 4247, p. 5)), but rather receives a management fee of7.5%
of Center's and Mobile's annual cash receipts for overseeing their operations (App. 11 (Trial Ex.
4024 § 4.2)). MRIA owns just 30% of Center and Mobile; Saint Alphonsus and other investors
own the remaining interests. (App. 37-40 (Trial Ex. 4247, pp. 5-8).)
In presenting evidence of lost profits, MRIA's two damages experts relied exclusively on
allegations of injury to Center and Mobile's business. Specifically, Bruce Budge estimated the
number of scans diverted from the limited partnerships to IM! and applied their revenue and cost
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figures in order to calculate the profits that were thus lost. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2732, L. 6 top. 2754,
L. 16.) MRlA's other expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's calculations to predict diverted

Jost future scans and resulting Jost profits. (Tr., Vol. III, p. 2861, L. 6 top. 2870, L. 21.)
The $36.3 million in damages thus represents profits allegedly lost by Center and/or
Mobile-the entities actually providing MRI scanning services-rather than any conceivable
injury to MRIA itself. And because MRIA owns just 30% of the limited partnerships, the
separate legal identity of these entities obviously cannot be ignored. Accordingly, this jury
award to "MRIA" cannot be affirmed on the theory that MRIA actually suffered such damages.

B.

The Award Of Lost Scan Profits Cannot Be Sustained On The Theory That
It Should Be Regarded As An Award To Center And/Or Mobile

Since MRIA did not suffer the lost profits damages that constitute the present award, the
award could only be sustained if this Court were to regard it as an award to one or both of the
limited partnerships, Center and/or Mobile. However, the only claims submitted to the jury on
behalf of Center and Mobile were causes of action for breach of the fiduciary duty allegedly
owed to those entities. (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96.) For two separate and independent reasons,
this Court cannot reasonably regard the damage award as one made to the limited partnerships on
that cause of action. First, because the claims of the limited partnerships were improperly
combined in a single, disjunctive special-verdict question with MRIA's own claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, there is no basis for concluding that the jury found Saint Alphonsus liable to
either Center or Mobile. Second, Center's and Mobile's claims fail as a matter oflaw because
Saint Alphonsus owed no fiduciary duties to them.
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1.

The Jury Verdict Provides No Basis For Concluding That The Jury
Actually Found Saint Alphonsus Liable To Center And/Or Mobile

Contrary to ordinary practice, the district court allowed MRIA to assert claims "on behalf
of" Center and Mobile without joining these distinct legal entities as parties. (R., Vol. V, pp.
868-71.)2 1 This created a substantial risk that the jury would fail to distinguish between MRIA
and the two limited partnerships and therefore not properly evaluate the separate legal rights,
claims asserted, and damages suffered by those entities. This risk came to fruition when the
court refused Saint Alphonsus's request for a special-verdict interrogatory that would have
distinguished the separate fiduciary duty claims of the three entities (see Exhibit to R. #230, Instr.
41, p. 3), and instead submitted a single special-verdict question (No. 9) asking the jury whether
"Saint Aiphonsus breached a fiduciary duty owed to MRIA, MRI Center or MRI Mobile" (R.,
Vol. XII, p. 2296 (emphasis added)). This was the only claim on behalf of Center and Mobile
submitted to the jury (R., Vol. XII, pp. 2293-96), and because the court combined it with
MRIA's own claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the jury was left with no way to indicate
whether or not it had found liability to Center and Mobile-as distinguished from MRIA.
This indeterminate character of the verdict arises from the disjunctive nature of the single
jury interrogatory (No. 9) dealing with this issue. That interrogatory required the jury to enter a
21

No legal authority permitted MRIA, as a general partner, to sue in a representative capacity
"on behalf of' the limited partnerships. A limited partnership is a distinct legal entity, with a
legal existence separate and apart from its partners, including its general partner. See Idaho
Code § 53-2-104. Further, a limited partnership has "the power to sue, be sued, and defend in its
own name," id.§ 53-2-105, and limited partnerships routinely do so in the courts of this State,
see, e.g., Brandon Bay, LP v. Payette County, 142 Idaho 681, 132 P.3d 438 (2006). The district
court thus erred when it allowed MRIA to proceed "on behalf of' the limited partnerships,
without naming those legal entities as distinct parties.
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finding of fiduciary duty liability if it concluded that Saint Alphonsus breached a fiduciary duty
owed to any one of the three claimants-MRIA, Center "or" Mobile. (R., Vol. XII, p. 2296.) As
to MRIA, under the instructions as given, the jury had no choice but to find a breach of the duty.

It was instructed that Saint Alphonsus was liable if it failed "to act primarily for the benefit" of
MRIA, ifit "act[edJ adversely" to MRIA, or ifit knowingly "violat[ed] the law." (Tr., Vol. III,
p. 4281, L. 21 top. 4283, L. 10.) It was also instructed that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation from
MRIA was "wrongful." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4271, L. 4-11; id. p. 4273, L. 23 top. 4275, L. 4; id.
p. 4283, L. 6-15.) By definition, such "wrongful" conduct.toward MRIA fell far short of acting
"primarily for [MRIA's] benefit" and constituted "adverse" action toward MRIA. The
conclusion that Saint Alphonsus violated its fiduciary duty to MRIA was thus unavoidable.
Given that conclusion, the jury was required to answer special-verdict question No. 9 in
the affirmative, even

if it found no fiduciary duty liability to either ofthe limited partnerships.

There was therefore no reason for the jury to proceed any further once it found a breach of duty
to MRIA-since question No. 9 would be answered "yes" however the separate claims of the
limited partnerships were resolved. Indeed, there is nothing in the verdict to suggest that the jury
ever even thought about the question of liability to Center and Mobile. There was absolutely no
reason for it to do so because, as noted above, the court had rejected Saint Alphonsus's request
for jury instructions and special-verdict interrogatories distinguishing among the three entities'
separate fiduciary duty claims. Accordingly, there is no basis on which to affirm the award of
damages on the theory that the jury really intended it to go to Center and/or Mobile.
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2.

The Limited Partnerships' Sole Claims-For Breach Of Fiduciary
Duty-Fail As A Matter Of Law Because Saint Alphonsus Owed No
Fiduciary Duties To Center And Mobile

Apart from the failure of the verdict form to communicate any decision by the jury on the
fiduciary duty claims of Center and Mobile, those claims fail as a matter of law. The district
court should have granted Saint Alphonsus's motions for summary judgment and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on those claims because Saint Alphonsus did not owe the limited
partnerships any fiduciary duties.
"Whether a fiduciary relationship exists is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review." Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,401, 111 P.3d 73,
86 (2005). Duties owed by parties in a commercial relationship are generally defined by the
agreements between them. See, e.g., Wooden v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 121 Idaho 98,
100,822 P.2d 995,997 (1991). For some relationships, such as officers and directors ofa
corporation, or partners in a partnership, a pertinent statute defines the applicable duties. See,

e.g., Idaho Code § 30-1-830. In some special circumstances in which one party has placed his
property, interests or authority in the charge of another, or reposed special trust and confidence
in him, the common law may give rise to fiduciary obligations. See Bliss Valley Foods,
121 Idaho at 277-78, 824 P.2d at 852-53.
Saint Alphonsus was both a limited partner in Center and Mobile and a partner in the
general partnership (MRIA) that was the general partner of both entities. As the court below
correctly held, neither of these relationships gave rise to any statutory fiduciary duties owed by
Saint Alphonsus to the limited partnerships. (R., Vol. X, pp. 1876-77.) RUPA defines with
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specificity the duties that Saint Alphonsus owed to MRIA, but it nowhere suggests that those
duties in any way extend further to other entities in which MRIA, but not Saint Alphonsus, is a
general partner. See Idaho Code§ 53-3-404 ("a partner owes [fiduciary duties] to the partnership
and the other partners"). And the Limited Partnership Act makes clear that only MRIA, as
general partner, and not Saint Alphonsus, as a limited partner, owed fiduciary duties to Center
and Mobile. See Idaho Code§ 53-224 (repealed effective July I, 2006). 22
The district court nonetheless looked past these governing statutes to find a common-law
fiduciary duty implied from the factual circumstances surrounding the relationship between Saint
Alphonsus and the limited partnerships. As this Court has explained, however, common-law
fiduciary duties arise only where one party places a "peculiar confidence" in another due to the
"condition of superiority" of one of the parties over the other. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at
277, 824 P.2d at 852. In other words, "in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or
authority of the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary." Id. (citation, emphasis, and
internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, arms-length relationships-especially involving
sophisticated business entities--do not give rise to fiduciary duties. See id. (lender-borrower
relationship did not give rise to common-law fiduciary duty).

22

The conduct at issue in this case occurred prior to July I, 2006, when the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act replaced the Limited Partnership Act as the law applicable to existing
limited partnerships. See Idaho Code § 53-2-1204. Accordingly, the breach of duty claim
brought on behalf of Center and Mobile is governed by the Limited Partnership Act. In any
event, the fiduciary standards set forth in the old and new versions of the Act are identical in all
relevant respects. Compare Idaho Code § 53-2-408 with Idaho Code§ 53-3-404 (made
applicable to limited partnerships by Idaho Code § 53-224 (repealed)).
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The district court held that Saint Alphonsus owed such common-law duties to Center and
Mobile because of "the unique manner in which [the limited partnerships] were organized,
structured, and operated." (R., Vol. X, p. 1880.) According to the court, this "unique" manner
consisted of the fact that two Saint Alphonsus "representatives ... sat on the [ten-member]
MRIA Board of Partners" and that this Board "conducted" the "business and affairs" ofMRIA,
including the management of Center and Mobile. (Id., p. 1879.)
These facts do not remotely satisfy the requirements for a common-law fiduciary duty. It
is of course true that the agreements creating the limited partnerships vested MRIA with "all
authority and responsibility" over the management of the businesses (App. 10, 16 (Trial Ex.
4024 § 4.1; Trial Ex. 4028 § 4.1 )), and that MRIA owed them on that account a statutory
fiduciary duty. But Saint Alphonsus had only two votes out often on the MRIA board, and thus
had no ability to compel any action by MRIA, especially over the opposition of the five votes
held by DMR. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that Saint Alphonsus's possession of
two out of ten votes on the MRIA board established a "condition of superiority" over Center and
Mobile or showed that the limited partnerships had placed a "peculiar confidence" in Saint
Alphonsus. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 277, 824 P.2d at 852.
Indeed, the district court's holding that Saint Alphonsus owed common-law fiduciary
duties to the limited partnerships, including the duty "to act primarily for the[ir] benefit" and to
refrain from competing with them, had the effect of imposing on Saint Alphonsus, in its role as a
minority stakeholder, a greater level of duty vis-a-vis Center and Mobile than the statutory duty
that MRIA itself owed to Center and Mobile as their general partner. This is because the duties
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owed by a general partner to a limited partnership are less strict than the fiduciary duties owed in
a common-law fiduciary relationship. As explained in the official comment to Idaho Code
§ 53-3-404, which sets forth the duties of the general partner to the limited partnerships in this
case, see Idaho Code§ 53-224 (repealed); supra note 22, "the term 'fiduciary' [arguably) is
inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner because a partner may legitimately
pursue self-interest and not solely the interest of the partnership and the other partners, as must a
true trustee." Idaho Code § 53-3-404 cmt.
In sum, having found no statutory basis for holding that Saint Alphonsus owed a
fiduciary duty to the limited partnerships, the district court should also have concluded, as a
matter of law, that no common-law fiduciary duty could be inferred from that relationship. 23
C.

MRIA's Proof Of Lost Scan Profits Was Fatally Deficient Because It Relied
On The Unsupported Assumption That Saint Alphonsus Caused Every
Single Change In Physician Referrals From Center To IMI

The damages claim also fails as a matter oflaw because MRIA produced no evidence to
connect its alleged $36.3 million in lost-scan damages, or any specific portion thereof, to Saint
Alphonsus's alleged misconduct. This claim rested on the premise that every referral of a patient
to IMI by any doctor who either had previously made referrals to Center or was affiliated only
with Saint Alphonsus resulted from that alleged misconduct. But MRIA and its experts simply
23

Even if the facts viewed most favorably to MRIA could support such an inference, a
reasonable juror could also have found an absence of the sort ofrelationship needed to give rise
to a common-law fiduciary duty. Indeed, the district court originally stated an intention to leave
this issue for resolution by the jury. (R., Vol. X, pp. 1877-80.) However, without warning at the
end of the trial, the court removed that question from the purview of the jury and held that the
duty was owed as a matter oflaw. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4201, L. 23 top. 4203, L. 21.) This was an
error of law that, at a minimum, requires a new trial.

- 50 -

"assumed" that the assistance Saint Alphonsus provided to IMI caused all of these referrals to go
to IMI. This assumption has no basis in law, logic or fact. The district court therefore erred
when it denied Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment on the issue of damage
causation (Exhibit to R. # 102, pp. 12- 16; R., Vol. XI, p. 2076), and erred again when it denied
Saint Alphonsus's motion for JNOV on that same issue (R., Vol. XIII, pp. 2435-36).
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that it was injured, but that its injury
was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with
reasonable certainty." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604,611
(2007). Moreover, "the trier of fact must be able to find, reasonably, that the inference linking
the defendant's conduct to the damage is more probable than an inference connecting the loss to
other causes." Wingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct. App. 1984); see also
Nw. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 41 I'.3d 263 (2002) (affirming district

court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to
establish damage causation). In the context of claims for lost business or lost profits, a plaintiff
may not presume that its loss is equivalent to its competitor's gain; instead, there must be
substantial proof of what this Court has called a "correspondence between what its profit would
have been and [the competitor's] actual profit." Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho
844,847, 172 P.Jd 1119, 1122 (2007).
This Court has thus rejected the idea that all of a plaintiffs lost business can be attributed
to a defendant's actionable conduct without specific proof of causation. In Pope v.
lntermountain Gas Co., for example, the trial court awarded lost-profit damages for antitrust
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violations based on the defendant's total revenues during the period that the violations occurred.
103 Idaho 217,222,646 P.2d 988,993 (!982). This Court reversed because "[s]uch a method of
figuring damages assumes, without any support in the record, that the [competitor's) operation
would not have won any portion of the ... market absent antitrust violations." I 03 Idaho at 234,
646 P.2d at 1005. Put another way, it is improper to assume "that 100% of [a company's)
business losses" are attributable to a competitor's misconduct where the plaintiff"never
attempted to isolate the effect of other causes on the volume of sales," including, for example,
"the entry of [the competitor) into the competitive marketplace." Synthes Spine Co. v. Walden,
No. 04-CV-4140, 2006 WL 30533 I 7, at* 16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006); see also Twin Falls Farm
& City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., 96 Idaho 351,360,528 P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974)

(noting that damages may not be awarded for "loss of customers" where "the evidence does not
support a finding that all of the losses ... were the result of the [defendants') breaches"
(emphasis added)). 24
Measured against these well-settled principles, MRIA's proof of damages causation is
inadequate as a matter oflaw. MRIA relied on two witnesses to support its lost-scan damages
calculation: Bruce Budge, who testified about damages from 1999 to 2006, and Charles
Wilhoite, who extrapolated from Budge's numbers to estimate future losses from 2007 to 2023.
In calculating how many scans Center "lost" as a result of the assistance allegedly provided to
24

As one court has explained, to accept a damages award based on the difference between
the plaintiff's revenues before and after the defendant's misconduct would "make a joke of the
concept of expert knowledge" where the plaintiffs expert "ascribe[s) the entire difference
between these revenue streams ... to [the defendant's) misconduct, and none to ... lawful
competition." Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410,415 (7th Cir. 1992).
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IMI by Saint Alphonsus, Budge included every scan from every doctor who had previously
referred scans to Center but then switched to IM!, as well as every scan from every doctor who
was affiliated only with Saint Alphonsus. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2738, L. 25 top. 2739, L. 12; id. p.
2741, L. 23 top. 2742, L. 23.) He did not explain how or why all these changes in referrals were
caused by Saint Alphonsus's alleged misconduct, but rather "assum[ed]" it, as though some other
expert would establish causation:

A. [Budge:) I'm assuming that without that course of conduct, that
migration would not have occurred.
Q. And you're not here to say that the bad acts caused it; you're
assuming that they caused it?
A. I'm not offering testimony on that. Logically, I need to
understand the causation, and it seems reasonable. But I'm not
weighing in on that."
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 2785, L. 25 top. 2786, L. 9.)
Budge's approach plainly fails to establish that Saint Alphonsus actually caused all of the
changed referrals or to show what portion of those changed referrals were caused by Saint
Alphonsus's conduct. Budge did not dispute that !MI would have existed regardless of Saint
Alphonsus's actions. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2732, L. 25 top. 2734, L. 17; id. p. 2764, L. I top. 2765,

L. 3.) But he nevertheless completely ignored the effects of"the entry of[IMI) into the
competitive marketplace," Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at* I 6, and simply
"assume[d) ... that [!MI] would not have won any portion of[this business) absent [Saint
Alphonsus's conduct)," Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at 1005. This was not enough. Budge
(or another expert) "should have tried to separate the damages that resulted from the lawful entry
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of a powerful competitor [IMI] ... from the damages that resulted from particular forms of
misconduct allegedly committed by" !MI and Saint Alphonsus. Schiller, 969 F.2d at 415-16; see
also Pope, 103 Idaho at 234,646 P.2d at 1005; Twin Falls, 96 ldaho at 360,528 P.2d at 1295.

Nor did any other witness fill the evidentiary gap. MRIA did not show that a single
physician actually changed his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's actions. To
the contrary, several physicians gave unrebutted testimony that they began referring to !MI
because of the identity and reputation of the IM! radiologists reading the scans, not because of
any conduct by Saint Alphonsus. (See Tr., Vol. III, p. 3910, L. 11 top. 3911, L. 7; id p. 3994,

L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16; id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.)
Indeed, the idea that Saint Alphonsus's conduct, including assistance it gave to IM!,
could have caused all of the identified IMI referrals defies common sense. Budge testified that
MRIA "had a monopoly" before IM! opened, "[a]nd when IMI came in, all of the sudden that
referral base was diverted." (See Tr., Vol. II, p. 2790, L. 12-14.) When a monopolist faces a
new competitor, some of its business is going to shift to the competitor, as Budge conceded.
(See Tr., Vol. II, p. 2792, L. 10-15 ("Doesn't logic dictate that if MRI ran into a very formidable

competitor, IM!, in 1999, logic certainly follows as to why IM!' s business would flourish and
MRI's business would begin to tail off? [Budge:] It could explain it.").) More specifically, !MI
was owned and operated by the group of radiologists who had, for many years, been serving the
needs of patients at Saint Alphonsus and reading the scans generated at Center, and thus had
long-standing consulting relationships with the treating physicians who worked at Saint
Alphonsus. (Tr., Vol. II, p. 2425, L. 4-12; Tr. Vol. III, p. 3461, L. 10-24.) It is absurd to
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suggest-and thus improper to allow the jury to infer-that none of the doctors that previously
referred to Center would have sent any referrals to the people they trusted at !Ml, if only Saint
Alphonsus had refrained from providing some technical support to !Ml. Indeed, as noted above,
the evidence actually presented at trial showed that the identity of the radiologists and their
established relationships and reputations were the main reasons that !MI took business away
from Center. (See Tr., Vol. Ill, p.3911, L. 1 top. 3911, L. 7; id. p. 3994, L. 8 top. 3995, L. 16;
id. p. 4138, L. 6 top. 4140, L. 4.) 25

In sum, to recover for lost profits, it was incumbent upon MRIA "to isolate the effect of
other causes" for its lost scans, including "the entry of [!MI] into the competitive marketplace."
Synthes Spine Co., 2006 WL 3053317, at *16. Because it did not do so, its claim for lost profits
fails as a matter of law.

D.

The Damages Award Is Also Defective Because It Includes $6.0 Million For
Injuries Allegedly Incurred After The Center Limited Partnership
Agreement Was Set To Expire

The district court also erred in allowing MRIA to seek recovery for "lost scan" damages
beyond December 31, 2015, the date on which the Center limited partnership was set to expire
pursuant to its limited partnership agreement. MRIA acknowledged this December 31, 2015
termination date for Center, but argued that Center's term had been extended to December 3 I,
2023. MRIA did not make any evidentiary showing to support its claim that the extension did, in
fact, occur, and the district court thus erred in allowing the jury to determine the question. As a
25

This case is thus unlike Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., in which there was no evidence
of alternative causation and every lost opportunity was "more likely than not attributable to" the
defendant's conduct. 143 Idaho 733, 741, 152 P.3d 604,612 (2007).
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result, Saint Alphonsus was found liable for an additional $6.0 million in future lost profits, as
calculated by MRIA's expert, between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2023-a period of
time when Center, by the terms of its limited partnership agreement, would have ceased to exist.

(Compare Tr., Vol. III, p. 2860, L 11-16 with Exhibit to R. #! 18, Ex. J (Expert Op. ofC.
Wilhoite) at 14.)
Section 1.1 of the limited partnership agreement expressly provides that the Center
partnership "shall continue ... through December 31, 2015," unless terminated earlier. (App. 7
(Trial Ex. 4024 § 1.1).) Section 9.1 of the agreement provides that the agreement "may be
amended only through [a] written instrument executed by the General Partner and the Limited
Partners owning 75% of the outstanding Units" of limited partnership interests. (App. 13 (Trial
Ex. 4024 § 9.1).) Although MRIA pointed to evidence of a vote on the question allegedly taken
in 1998, it presented no evidence that any such written instrument was ever executed by the
general partner and the limited partners, as required by the agreement. 26
Furthermore, it is undisputed that on August 18, 2000-long after the extension allegedly
occurred-MRIA filed with the Secretary of State an Amended Certificate of Limited
26

MRIA effectively conceded its failure to produce such evidence, but instead claimed that
the limited partnership agreement was ambiguous and could be read to allow MRIA to extend
Center's term at will. (R., Vol. XII, at 2391.) The contract's "interpretation and legal effect are
questions oflaw," Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955,
960 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and as a matter of law, there is no ambiguity
here. MRIA relied on Section 4 of the agreement, which gives MRIA the exclusive right to
manage the limited partnership, and deemed it to be in conflict with the requirements of Section
9.1 for modifying the limited partnership agreement. But the two provisions are entirely
consistent because the power to manage Center's business pursuant to the terms of the limited
partnership agreement is separate and distinct from the power to change the very terms of that
agreement.
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Partnership for Center, which indicated that the limited partnership term was to end in 2015.
(App. 50 (Trial Ex. 104); see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 3523, L. 10 top. 3525, L. 2.) Thus, not only
was there no evidence showing that the steps necessary to extend Center's term were completed,
but the only evidence from the post-vote period shows that no extension was ever finalized.
In short, the unambiguous terms of the limited partnership agreement required a 75%
vote of the limited partnership interests and a writing to be effective. The complete absence of
any evidence of such steps is thus fatal to MRJA's extension claim, as no reasonable jury could
have found, on the evidence presented, that Center's term had been extended to 2023. For this
reason also, the $6.0 million in damages for the period between 2016 and 2023 must be set aside.

E.

MRIA Is Not Entitled To The Claimed Alternative Measure Of Damages
Based On The Hypothetical Purchase Price Of Center

If the $36.3 million lost-profits measure of damages is set aside, MRIA will likely seek
reinstatement of the $27 .3 million award based on the "purchase price" of Center, which was set
aside by the district court's remittitur. (R., Vol. XIII, p. 2435.) MRIA has maintained
throughout the proceedings that this latter measure of damages is being asserted solely for the
wrongful dissociation claim brought by MRIA, and that this measure of damages in theory
represents the money that Saint Alphonsus would have had to pay to MRIA to rightfully
withdraw from the partnership. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 574, L. 13 top. 584, L. 9; Tr., Vol. III, p. 4382,
L. 6 top. 4385, L. 25.) However, even if Saint Alphonsus were liable on the claim for wrongful
dissociation, but see supra Parts I.A & LC, MRIA's purchase-price theory of damages is not a
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legally sound way to measure damages for breach of contract because it does not even purport to
measure any injury allegedly suffered by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation.
"[T]he proper measure of damages is a question of law which is reviewed de nova." Gen.

Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 854, 979 P.2d l 207, 1212 (1999). The
correct measure of damages for a claimed breach of contract is "the loss in the value ... of [the
breaching party's] performance ... plus any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused
by the breach." Gilbert v. Tony Russell Constr., 115 Idaho 1035, 1039, 772 P.2d 242,245 (Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 347 (1981)). In the specific context of
partnership contracts, RUPA specifies that "[a] partner who wrongfully dissociates is liable to
the partnership and to the other partners for damages caused by the dissociation," Idaho Code
§ 53-3-602(c), such as "replacing the partner's expertise or obtaining new financing," id. § 53-3602 cmt. 3.
MRIA's "purchase price" theory of damages violates these fundamental principles.
Instead of trying to show the extent of the harm caused to MRIA by Saint Alphonsus 's
dissociation in 2004, MRIA advanced a convoluted theory that resulted in an award far greater
than any plausible amount of actual injury. Specifically, MRIA argued that dissociating allowed
Saint Alphonsus to imperrnissibly compete against MRIA. (R., Vol. IX, p. 1687.) But rather
than trying to quantify the harm to MRIA from this competition, MRIA argued that it should
recover "the fair market value of a transaction"-Saint Alphonsus's hypothetical purchase of
Center's entire business from MRIA-"that [would have] rightfully accomplished what [Saint
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Alphonsus] has, to date, secured wrongfully." (Id.; see also Tr., Vol. III, p. 4310, L. 22-23)
("The $27.3 million represents what it would have cost Saint Al's to do this the right way.").)
The price that Saint Alphonsus would have paid for Center bears no relation to any harm
suffered by MRIA as a result of Saint Alphonsus's dissociation. In particular, MRIA has never
claimed that this dissociation totally destroyed Center or rendered it valueless, such that the
"purchase price" accurately measures actual injury. Nor did MRIA have any contractual right to
the "purchase price" that was lost as a result of the dissociation, for the simple reason that Saint
Alphonsus had no contractual obligation to purchase Center, whether or not it stayed in the
partnership. Indeed, MRIA's "purchase price" theory of damages is all the more absurd given
that MRIA only owns 30% of Center (see supra note 2) and therefore cannot possibly have
suffered damages equivalent to the full value of Center.
In sum, because the supposed price of purchasing Center has nothing to do with any
injury to MRIA caused by Saint Alphonsus's dissociation, MRIA cannot recover that "purchase
price" as a measure of damages.

IV.

SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that "[i]n any civil action" arising out of"any

commercial transaction ... , the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to
be set by the court." This provision "compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in
a civil action to recover in any commercial transaction," Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M &
Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955, 965 (2008), and provides for the recovery
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of fees incurred both at trial and on appeal, see, e.g., Fox v. Mountain W Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho
703, 712, 52 P.3d 848, 857 (2002).
After trial, the district court awarded fees to MRIA under§ 12-120(3), holding that
MRIA's claims arose out of a commercial transaction because they relate to the alleged "breach
of express terms contained within a partnership agreement - a contract." (R., Vol. XIII, p.
2448.) This holding reflects the general rule that fees are appropriate under§ 12-120(3) where
the claims at issue are "integral" to a business relationship, such as claims for the breach of a
commercial contract like the one that existed between MRIA and Saint Alphonsus. Esser Elec. v.

Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 188 P.3d 854,863 (2008).
Accordingly, if this Court rules for Saint Alphonsus, it should award Saint Alphonsus its
attorney fees on appeal to be determined in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 4 I. In
addition, because Saint Alphonsus rather than MRIA will be the "prevailing party" in this civil
action, the district court's award of fee and costs for MRIA should be vacated along with the
judgment for MRIA, and the case remanded with instructions that the district court calculate and
award the fees and costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial.
CONCLUSION
1.

For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus requests entry of judgment as follows:

a.

Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA' s claims for wrongful

dissociation because, as a matter of law, Saint Alphonsus's dissociation breached neither an
express term of the partnership agreement (see Part I.A) nor a term of years (see Part LC), and
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also because MRIA's theory of"purchase price" damages in support of this claim is legally
inadequate and unsupported by the evidence (see Part III.E).
b.

Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA's claims for breach of

the non-compete clause, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, tortious interference with prospective business relations and conspiracy because MRIA
offered no evidence of damages that were even arguably suffered by MRIA, as distinct from the
limited partnerships, Center and Mobile (see Part III.A), and also because MRIA failed in any
event to prove that Saint Alphonsus caused all or any particular portion of the claimed lost
profits (see Part III.C).
c.

Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on the claims for breach of

fiduciary duty brought "on behalf" of Center and Mobile because the jury verdict cannot
reasonably be construed as finding liability to Center and Mobile on those claims (see Part
III.B.l), because Saint Alphonsus as a matter of law owed no fiduciary duties to Center and
Mobile (see Part III.B.2), and also because MRIA failed to prove that Saint Alphonsus actually
caused all or any specific portion of the claimed lost profits (see Part 111.C).
2.

In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial on all of the claims

asserted in the district court because (a) the district court's erroneous grant of summary judgment
on the claim for wrongful dissociation (see Part I.A) and the court's evidentiary errors (see Part
II), separately and cumulatively, prejudiced the jury against Saint Alphonsus and denied Saint
Alphonsus a fair trial (see Parts LB & II), and also because (b) whether Saint Alphonsus
breached an express term of the partnership agreement by dissociating and whether Saint
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Alphonsus owed any fiduciary duty to Center and Mobile are questions that, at a minimum,
should have been submitted to the jury rather than resolved against Saint Alphonsus as a matter
oflaw. (See Parts I.A n.7 & IV.B.2 n.23.)
3.

In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a $6 million reduction in the

damages assessed because any award of lost profits should not have included profits allegedly
lost after 2015. (See Part Ill.D.)
4.

Saint Alphonsus further requests that this Court award Saint Alphonsus its

attorney fees on appeal, and also reverse the district court's award of costs and fees to MRIA and
remand for calculation and award of the costs and fees incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial. (See
Part IV.)
Dated: September 12, 2008

Respectfully Submitted,

Donald B. Ayer
Christian G. Vergonis
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113

S. Gjording
J RD/NG & Fous
9 W. Hays Street
P.O. Box 2837
Boise, ID 83701
Patrick J. Miller
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 W. Bannock Street
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Boise, ID 83701-2720
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ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP
OF
MRI ASSOCIATES
THESE ARTICLES OP PARTNERSHIP have been entered into
effective this .26th day of April, 1985, by and among DOCTORS
MAGNETIC RESONANCE, INC., an Idaho corporation ("OMR"), SAINT
ALPHONSUS MAGNETIC RESONANCE, !NC., an Idaho nonprofit
corporation ("SAMR"J, MEDNOW, INC., an Idaho corporation ("MN"),
and HCA OF IDAHO, INC., an Idaho corporation ("HCA"),
Except as modified hereunder, the parties hereto hereby
form a general partnership pursuant to the Uniform Partnership
Law of the State of Idaho. The parties agree that the conduct of
the Partnership shall be in accordance with the terms and
provisions herein set forth.
ARTICLE l
GENERAL PROVIS ION/l
Section 1.1 Effective Date and Term. The effective
date of these Articles of ·Partnership is the twenty-sixth day of
April, 1985, and shall terminate as follows:
1,1.l If the Limited Partnership contemplated pursuant
to Section 1,6 is not formed and the limited partnership
interests sold in accordance with the Private Placement
Memorandum, or this Partnership does not otherwise acquire
financing acceptable to all Partners to replace the funds
which were to be acquired by the limited partnership
offering, on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of
this Partnership shall end on December 31, 1985.
l, l. 2 • If the Limited Partnership contemplated by
Section 1.6 is formed and the limited partnership interests
sold, and/or other financing mutually acceptable to all
Partners to replace all or a portion of the funds which were
to be acquired by the limited partnership offering is
acquired on or before December 31, 1985, then the term of
this Partnership shall end on the date which is within a
reasonable time after the busine·ss of the Partnetship is
wound up and dissolved under Article 10.
In the event the Partnership terminates due to a failure
of the conditions set forth in Section 1.1.l, all debts and
obligations incurred by or on behalf of the Partnership shall be
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Section 1,6 Purpose. The purpose of this Partnership
is to purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, finance, manage
operate, use, control, hold, sell and otherwise transfer medical
diagnostic devices, equipment and accessories and therapeutic
devices, equipment and accessories related to such diagnostic
devices and equipment, together with buildings and other
facilities associated therewith, and to transact any and all
business matters incident thereto. The initial diagnostic
equipment to be acquired shall be a magnetic resonance imaging
device.
This Partnership intends to promote and organize an
Idaho limited partnership (the "Limited Partnership"). Limited
partnership interests in the Limited Partnership shall be offered
for sale pursuant to a Private Placement Memorandum approved by
the Board of Partners as provided in section 5.4.5 and prepared
and presented in accordance with applicable federal and state
securities laws and exemptions. When formed, the Limited
Partnership shall have the same purpose as this Partnership.
This Partnership and any entity in which it has an
ownership interest shall not engage in any other business
activity except those set forth above without the approval of the
Board of Partners required by Section 5,4.4.
ARTICLE 2
MANAGEMENT FEE
Section 2,1 Management Fee. When the timited
Partnership is formed, the Limited Partnership Agreement will
provide for an annual management fee payable by the Limited
Partnership to the Partnership of $90,000 or 7,5% of the Limited
Partnership's annual cash receipts from operations, whichever is
greater. The management fee will be paid to the Partnership in
monthly installments of $7,500 each, with an annual adjustment to
be made at the time the annual audit of the Limited Partnership
is completed, if such audit shows that annual cash receipts from
operations exceed $1,200,000.
2.1.l Unless and until a Partner's interest in this
Partnership is terminated or transferred as authorized in
Articles 6, 7 and 8, or a new Partner is admitted, when
received by the Partnership, the management fee will be
forthwith allocated among and paid to the Partners, as
follows,
5/9

DMR

2/9
l/9

SAMR
MN

1/9

FICA
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Catholic Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or
may be in violation of any local, state or federal laws, rules or
regulations. tn the event that a Hospital Partner withdraws,
such Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall
terminate on the date of withdrawal, and that interest,
including, without limitation, the Hospital Partner's vote on the
Board of Partners and its interest in the Partnership management
fee, shall be reallocated among the remaining Hospital Partners,
(If there are no remaining Hospital Partners, the reallocation
shall be among the remaining Partners), Unless otherwise agreed,
the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall only be entitled to
receive for its interest in the Partnership an amount which is
equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account
at the time of withdrawal,
'

6.2 Payment for Interest. The price for the
withdrawing Hospital Partner's interest in the Partnership shall
be paid to such Hospital Partner by the Partners to which its
interest in the Partnership has been allocated, without interest,
in installments equal to, and due at the same time as,
distributions of the Net Cash Flow which .the Hospital Partner
would have received had it remained a Partner in the Partnership.
6,3 Loans and Other Liabilities. Loans payable to the
withdrawing Hospital Partner shall be paid as provided herein,
Withdrawal shall not relieve the Hospital Partner from its
contingent liability for its Capital Ratio share of Partnership
liabilities in existence on the date of withdrawal,
ARTICLE 7
TRANSFERS OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
Section 7, 1 Restrictions. No Partner shall sell,
assign, transfer, pledge or hypothecate its interest in the
Partnership, including all of its property and assets, or agree
to do the same, except in accordance with the provisions of this
Article.
Section 7.2 Transfers Between Partners. A Partner may
sell, assign and transfer its interest in the Partnership to the
Partnership or to another Partner for such price and on such
terms and conditions as they may agree subject to the following
rights of refusal. In the event that any Hospital Partner
receives an offer to purchase its interest in the Partnership and
desires to accept such offer, that Hospital Partner first shall
give written notice of such offer to all the other Partners, The
notice shall set forth all the terms of such offer, including the
name and address of the proposed purchaser. The Hospital
Partners receiving such notice shall have forty-five (45) days
after they have received notice to elect to purchase such

- 12 ········--···--····· .. · - - -

App. 5
12

020002

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
OF

MRI LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
THIS L!MITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT of MRI LIMITED
PARTNER~IP (the 7artnership") has been entered into effective
this :z_.o day of f±l/,611 S.T , 1985, by and among the persons and
entit'Ieswhose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as the General
Partner and as the Limited Partners respectively,
The parties hereto hereby form a limited partnership
pursuant to the Idaho Limited Partnership Act. The parties agree
that the conduct of the Partnership shall be in accordance with
the terms and provisions herein set forth.
ARTICLE l
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1.1
Effective Date and Term. The effective date of
this Agreement and the Partnership shall be the date that the
Certificate of Limited Partnership is filed with the office of
the Idaho Secretary of State on behalf of the Partnership. The
Partnership shall continue from the effective date through
December 31, 2015, unless earlier dissolved in accordance with
the provisions of Article 6 hereof.
Section 1,2
Offices: Registered Agent. The office of the
Partnership shall be maintained in the City of Boise, County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and such other locations in the State of
Idaho as may be selected by the General Partner. The registered
agent of the Partnership for service of process shall be such
individual or corporation as shall be selected by the General
Partner.
Section 1.3

Partners.

1.3.1 The term "Partners" shall refer, collectively and
individually, to those persons and entities who are parties
to this A.greement and ·those persons and entities hereafter
admitted to partner status, excluding those whose status as a
Partner has been terminated as provided in Article 5.
l,3.2 The term "General Partner• shall refer to MRI
ASSOCIATES, an Idaho general partnership.
1.3.3 The term "Limited Partners" shall refer
individually and collectively to those persons and entities
whose names appear on Exhibit A hereto as Limited Partners
.._ EXHIBIT·.
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and shall mean the cash on hand at the beginning of a fiscal year
plus total cash receipts of the Partnership for such fiscal year
(excluding capital contributions for such fiscal year) from which
there shall be deducted: (i) all current operating expenses of
the Partnership (excluding any expense not involving a cash
expenditure, such as any amount charged for depreciation), (ii)
all payments made on Partnership obligations during such fiscal
year, (iii) any amounts spent by the Partnership for capital
expenditures during such fiscal year; (iv) the amounts due during
such fiscal year to Partners (principal and interest) on any
loans made to the Partnership; and (v) a reserve for working
capital, the amount of which shall be determined by the General
Partner in its absolute discretion.
Section 3.2

Distribution of Excess Net Cash Flow.

3.2.1 Unless and until the Limited Partners have
received cash distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2,
equal to their total capital contributions made pursuant to
sections 2.1,3 and 2.1.5, the General Partner shall·.
distribute Net Cash Flow among the Partners in the following
proportions (hereinafter referred to as "Sharing Ratios") not
later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year:
General Partner
Limited Partners

11
99\

3.2,2 After the Limited Partners have received cash
distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, equal to their
total capital contributions made pursuant to Sections 2,l,3
and 2.l.5, the General Partner shall distribute Net Cash Flow
among the Partners in the following Sharing Ratios not later
than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year:
General Partner
Limited Partners

30%
701

3.2.3 At all times, the Net Cash Flow distributed to
the Limited Partners collectively shall be distributed among
the various Limited Partners in the same relationship of the
amounts of their respective capital contributions made
pursuant to Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.S.
3.2.4 Anything to the contrary herein notwithstanding,
no distributions of Net Cash Flow shall be made at any time
that payments on any Partnership obligation shall be
delinquent. No Partner shall be entitled to any Net Cash
Flow distributions or any other distributions if such Partner
is in material default of the terms of this Agreement.
Material default shall include, without limitation, the
failure to make a capital contribution required pursuant to
Section 2.1.3,
.. -'\,1---::---
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under the Idaho Limited Partnership Act, the General Partner
shall have the power, on behalf of the Partnership:
4.1.l To expend the capital of the Partnership for the
acquisition, establishment, operation and management of a
medical diagnostic facility, including without limitation the
acquisition of any real or personal property, in fee or
lease, or any rights therein, necessary or appropriate for
the operation of such facility:
4.1.2 To negotiate, and enter into, agreements of every
nature necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of the
Partnership's purpose, including without limitation
agreements with the General Partner or the partners that
comprise the General Partner1
4.1.3 To employ from time to time at the expense of the
Partnership, persons, firms or corporations to render
services generally needed to accomplish the Partnership's
purposes:
4.1.4 To borrow monies for and on behalf of the
Partnership upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
advisable and proper by secured or unsecured indebtedness
and, in connection therewith, to issue evidences of
indebtedness and execute and deliver mortgages, deeds of
trust, assignments, and other security instruments of every
nature and kind as security therefor, and to prepay or
refinance any Partnership debt; and
4.1.5 To execute, acknowledge and deliver any and all
instruments, and to take such other steps as are necessary,
to effectuate the foregoing and as are consistent therewith.
Section 4.2 • . Management Fee. For its services in the management
of the Partnership, the General Partner shall receive an annual
fee equal to the greater of Ninety Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($90,000.00) or seven and one-half percent (7.5%) of the
Partnership's cash receipts from operations. For its services
during 1985, the General Partner shall receive a management fee
of Ninety Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($90,000,00).· The
management fee will be paid in monthly installments of Seven
Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($7,500.00) each, with
an annual adjustment to be made at the time that the annual audit
of the Partnership is completed, if such audit shows that annual
cash receipts from operations exceed One Million Two Hundred
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1,200,000.00). Such management fee
shall be a guaranteed payment, shall be treated as a current
operating expense of the Partnership, and shall be in addition to
any distribution of Net Cash Flow that the General Partner
receives, based upon its Sharing Ratio In addition to the annual
management fee, the Partnership shall reimburse the General
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otherwise determined by the General Partner, and shall be kept at
the offices of the Partnership. Within 75 days after the close
of each fiscal year of the Partnership, the General Partner shall
furnish to each Limited Partner all the information necessary for
the preparation of his federal, state, local or other tax
returns. Within 120 days after the close of each fiscal year of
the Partnership, the General Patner shall furnish to each Limited
Partner audited financial statements prepared in accordance with
then generally accepted accounting principles by the independent
certified public accountants of the Partnership. All financial
statements shall be accurate in all material respects and shall
present fairly the financial position and results of the
operations of the Partnership.
Section ~.3
Other Restrictions. No Partner shall become a
surety, guarantor or accommodation party as a Partner or in such
manner as would impose an obligation thereunder upon the
Partnership or the remaining Partners.
Section 8.4
Notice. Any notice required or permitted· to be
delivered hereunder shall be deemed received when personally
delivered or when deposited in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, registered or certified with return receipt requested,
or sent by telegram or mailgram, or by recognized courier
delivery (i.e., Federal Express, Airborne, Burlington, etc.),
addressed to the Partners as the case may be, at the address set
forth on Exhibit A, or at such other addresses as a Partner
subsequently designates by written notice given in the manner
provided in this section.
ARTICLE 9
AMENDMENT--SEVERABILITY
Section 9.1
Amendments. This Agreement may be amended only
through written instrument executed by the General Partner and
the Limited Partners owning 75% of the outstanding Units.
Section 9.2
Severability. It is agreed that the invalidi~y_or
unenforceability of any Article, Section, paragraph or provision
of shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any one or
more of the other Articles, Sections, paragraphs or provisions
thereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Limited Partnership Agreement
has been executed the day and year herein first above written.
GENERAL PARTNER:

MRI Associates
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2.2.2 Partnership borrowings and all other Partnership
obligations shall be paid from funds of the Partnership
available for and subject to distribution to the Partners.
If such Partnership funds are insufficient, the General
Partner may loan funds to the Partnership or make a
contribution to Partnership capital in the amount of such
deficiency.
ARTICLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF NET CASH FLOW AND
ALLOCATION OF PROFIT AND LOSS
Section 3.1
Net cash Flow Defined. As used in this Article,
the term "Net cash Flow• shall be determined for each fiscal year
and shall mean the cash on hand at the beginning of a fiscal year
plus total cash receipts of the Partnership for such fiscal year
(excluding capital contributions for such fiscal year) from which
there shall be deducted: (i) all current -0perating expenses of
the Partnership (excluding any expense not involving a cash
expenditure, such as any amount charged for depreciation);
(ii) all payments made on Partnership obligations during such
fiscal year; (iii) any amounts spent by the Partnership for
capital expenditures during such fiscal year; {iv) the amounts
due during such fiscal year to Partners (principal and interest)
on any loans made to the Partnership; and (v) a reserve for
working capital, the amount of which shall be determined by the
General Partner in its absolute discretion •

•

section 3.2

Distribution of Excess Net Cash Flow.

3.2.l Unless and until the Limited Partners have
received cash distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2,
equal to 50% of their total capital contributions made
pursuant to Section 2.1.3, the General Partner shall
distribute Net Cash Flow among the Partners in the following
proportions {hereinafter referred to as "Sharing Ratios") not
later than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year:
General Partner
Limited Partners

1%
99%

3.2.2 After the Limited Partners have received cash
distributions, pursuant to this Section 3.2, equal to 50% of
their total capital contributions made pursuant to section
2.1.3, the General Partner shall distribute Net Cash Flow
among the Partners in the following Sharing Ratios not later
than 120 days after the end of each fiscal year:
General Partner
Limited Partners

30%
70%

3.2.3 At all times, the Net Cash Flow distributed to
the Limited Partners collectively shall be distributed among
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MRI CENTER OF IDAHO

October 22, 1998

DATE:
TIME AND
PLACE:

Dining Room B, at 5:30 P.M., Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical
Center
)

PRESENT:

Sandra Bruce, President & CEO,
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Mark Adams, Chief Executive Officer,
West Valley Medical Center
Milt Kutsurelis, Executive Vice President,
Mercy Medical Center
Marty Hutson, CFO, Holy Rosary Medical Center
John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D.
David J. Giles, M.D.
Roger J. Curran, M.D.
Thomas E. Henson, M.D.
James M. Prochaska, M.D.
Tim Gilliam, MRI CI Chief Operations Officer
Lyndee Chatterton, MRI CI Chief Operations Officer
Jeff Cliff, Practice Management
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management
Tim Hall, M.D.
Paul Traughber, M.D.

RECORDING:

Paul DeWitt, Practice Management

EXCUSED:

Karl Kurtz, Vice President of Finance ,
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Mike Czech, Director, MRICI

CALL TO ORDER:
MOTION:

The meeting was opened at 5:30 P.M., with a brief discussion of the
minutes dated September 10, 1998. Motion was moved, seconded
and carried to approve the minutes dated September 10, 1998.

App. 17
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MRI CENTER OF IDAHO
COMMITTEE
REPORTS:

MINUTES 10-22-98
Page 3 of3

Eauioment, Building and Personnel
James M. Prochaska, M.D. requested a formal written policy be
incorporated regarding the handling of hospital STAT MRI cases.
Lyndee Chatterton will meet with VP of nursing and report to the
board.

AD,JOURNMENT:

There being no further business to come before the Board,
the meeting was adjourned at 8:40 P.M.
The next meeting will be held Wednesday, November 18, 1998,
5:30 P.M., Sister Patricia, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center.

Sandra Bruce, President & CEO,
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

App. 19
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4) VISION STATEMENT: The Vision Statement was affinned It is a goal to have this
same quality service ten years from now in all subsequent Imaging Centers.
B.

ARCHITECTURAL IMAGES: Dr. Seabourn met with Mike Falash. The room sizes have
been determined and Toshiba's electrical drawings are in. Siemens drawings should be in
by the end of the month. Mike would like to submit the final drawings to the Planing and
Zoning Committee by the first of March if all goes well. Dr. Scaboum will ask Mike to fit
the recovery room area with diagonal doors. Dr. Seaboum will also talk to Mike regarding
if doors are necessary to protect the workers from radiation dose berween rooms. The
storage area will be left as is.

C.

LOGO: Dr. Newton has spoken with Tom Foerstel from Foerstel Design regarding a logo
for the center. Dr. Newton stated that Tom preferred to have a condensed list of suggestions
and a discussion was held lo compile a list of ideas for Tom to begin working with. (See
attachment).

D.

PHONE: The deadline for space in the phonebook is 9-99. Of.Murray stated that an
account will need to be established. Dr. Murray will also check with the other phonebook
companies. Dr. Murray stated thal the Group has a choice of 14 prefixes. Dr. Murray will
check to see what prefixes are available to allow 9729 (x-ray) to be used as the last four
digits. The need for an 800 number was also raised. Dr. Murray questioned if the Group
would like to advertise to the more remote regions such as Mountain Home, Ontario, etc. [1
was decided that Mountain Home, Caldwell, McCall and Nampa should be included.
Advertisements will run approximately $425.00 per month for 1/, page ad, $850.00 per
month for 1/, page ad and $ I ,800.00 per month for a full-page ad. It was felt that a ¼ page
ad could be used in the beginning. Dr. Murray will get back with the Executive Committee
regarding the prices for the remote regions. Mike Falash will need to know where the
phones are being installed for the final plans. Dr. Seaboum will send a copy of the plans to
Gary Westcott· to help finalize the phone locations.

E,

MARKETING: This issue will be addressed at a later date.

F.

MRJ NEGOTlA TIONS: A formal proposal has not yet been offered. The recently
scheduled meeting was cancelled due to Paul De Witt's surgery. Dr. Prochaska stated that he
would look at the basic points of the proposed contract and meet with Drs. Traughber, Hall
and Seaboum to discuss them. It is difficult for Dr. Prochaska to discuss too much due to
his position on the MRJ Board. He did state that the process of obtaining an agreement is as
important as the end result. Dr. Seaboum would like the Group to give a set of goals and
desires to obtain with the MRI Board. Dr. Hall felt that the Group will be competing with
the MRI Center of Idaho and this will either tear them apart or bring them closer. Dr.
Prochaska stated that the Group needs to be unified so as not to tear them apart and casting a
vote twice in a voting and decision making process may help in this endeavor. Both the
Group and the MRJ Board must be willing to give up certain things to work together. Dr.
Giles raised the question as to what can the Group bring to the MRJ Board that will help to
persuade the.Board that ii is important to partner with the Group. The Group felt that they
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MRI EXECUTIVE MEETING MINUTES
DATE:

June 16, 1999

PRESENT:

Marty Hutson, CFO, Holy Rosary Hospital

James M Prochaska, M.D.
Thomas E. Henson, M.D.
David J. Giles, M.D.
J. Roger Curran, M.D.
John M. Havlina, Jr., M.D.
Jeffrey Cliff, Practice Management, Inc.
Paul DeWitt, Practice Management, Inc.
Sandra Bruce, President & CEO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Cindy Schamp, COO, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
Milt Kutsurelis, Executive Vice President, Mercy Medical Center
Mark Adams, CEO, West Valley Medical Center
ABSENT:
RECORDING:

Paul DeWitt, Practice Management, Inc.

DISCUSSION:

The board discussed the ongoing negotiations with Saint Alphonsus Radiology
Group for the MR1 portion of an independent imaging center located in Boise.
The items discussed included:
1: The purchase ofan equity position in MRI Associates by SARG.
2: The lease of space for the MRI portion of the imaging center.
3: Additional imaging centers.
4: Management fee for the imaging center.
5: Shift in management of the imaging center.
6: Amorti7.ation of capital improvements paid out of cash flow.
The purchase of an equity position in MRI Associates by SARG:
The board was asked to consider a purchase price for SARG to obtain an
ownership percentage equivalent to a member in Doctors Corp. after the buy in. It
was noted that the four physician partners have tendered an offer to Dr. Tom
Henson for his general partner share in the amount of $1,200,000. One possible
method suggested was to use 900,000 or 1,000,000 as a base purchase price and
increase or decrease that amount by 20% depending on an appraisal to be
obtained by the hospital partners. The hospitals stated that they could not agree to
any number without an independent appraisal. The hospitals are required to have
an independent appraisal for any joint venture with physicians to determine
proper FMY. Cindy Schamp stated she could have an appraisal by next board
meeting. The hospitals also raised a concern about who should pay ll:>r lbe

. ·-·-·--·- - ···--· ·7 --- ...
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David I.

'Jes, M.D.

Medical Director, MRI Center ofidaho
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Confidential Draft for Discussion
Restructuring oflvIRI A.ssociatcs General Partnership

1)

To ensure the stability of its .imaging business, SARMC needs to
u long-term equity incentive opportunity for irs
rad:iologists; at prest,nt, thi.s objective can only be achieved within
the framework of'MRl Associate.s (the "Partnership")

provlde

2)

Currnnl staff radiologists d(; not view participation m MRI
A.~sociat,,s as an attractive long-term equity incentive due to
economic une.crtainiy with M.RI Mobile ("Mobile") and political
concerns regarding Doctors lvfognetic: Resornmce, !ne, ("DMR")

3)

The ~
kev to restructurina"" the Par1ncrshil1. is control of Board of
Directors, of whicb DMR ewTently has 50 percent of the available
·votes

4)

Any restru.ctwfog of the P.,rt11ership is 1mlikcly to occur withollt a
buy-out of l IJ() percent of DM.R's Partnership interest

5)

~,-:>:>11A1·al]v
.Purchase of DMR's partm;rship interest appears 1,1,.,,'-"
attraetive, albeit potentially inflated given the aggressive
rat.clvolu1ne pmjeotions of Mobile's nwnagemem

6)

Deve.Joping a restructuring plan is ern:riplicated by differing
economic and/or political objectives of the General .Partnei ("GP'')
members, and potential legal ehalfonges by Li:rnited Partner ("LP'')
members of Mobtle and MRI fdaho ("Idaho")

7)

Depending on the specific rnsimctmillg. plan, Mobil\; may no
longer be a financial viable entity with its current capital structure

8)

A complete liquidation of the Partnership may prove w he an
at1raetivc alternative to a rentnwturing scenario, although lbc
financial implications II> GJ' m.ernbers have no1 been fully ai::sessed

\.J

,. .,
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interest in the MRI operation as provided in Section 7.3.2. If and when Diversified Care
acquires a 50% interest in the MRI operation, this Agreement will apply to the ownership,
operation and management of both the MRI and non-MR! operations of the Company.

1.2. Formation. ICR formed the Company pursuant to the Act by filing Articles of
Organization on July 23, 1999. By execution of this Agreement, Diversified Care is admitted
as a Member of the Company effective as of the date of this Agreement. Upon the request
of the Managing Committee or <\S required by law, the parties shall promptly execute all
amendments of the Articles of Organization and all other documents that are needed to enable
the Managing Committee to accomplish all filing, recording, publishing and other acts
necessary or appropriate to comply with all requirements for the operation of the Company
under the Act.
1.3. Intent. It is the intent of the Members that the Company be operated in a
manner consistent with its treatment as a "partnership" for federal and state income tax
purposes. It is also the intent of the Members that the Company not be operated or treated as
a "partnership" for purposes of Section 303 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. No Member
shall take any action inconsistent with the express intent of the parties hereto as set forth
herein.
1.4.

Definitions. Capitalized terms used in this Agreement are defined in Article 2.
ARTICLE 2 DEFINITIONS

The following terms used in this Agreement shall have the meanings described below:
2.1.
"Act" shall mean the Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, Idaho Code, Title
53, Chapter 6, as may be amended from time to time.
2.2.
the Code.

"Adjusted Basis" shall have the meaning given such term in Section 1011 of

2.3. "Adjusted Capital Account Deficit" means with respect to any Member, the
deficit balance, if any, in that Member's Capital Account as of the end of the relevant Fiscal
Year, after giving effect to the following adjustments: (i) credit to that Capital Account the
amount by which that Member is obligated to restore or is deemed to be obligated to restore
pursuant to the penultimate sentences of Treasury Regulation Sections l.704-2(g)(l) and
(i)(5); and (ii) debit to that Capital Account tl1e items described in paragraphs (4), (5) and (6)
in Section l.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations. This definition of Adjusted
Capital Account Deficit is intended to comply with the provisions of Section
l.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d) of the Treasury Regulations and shall be interpreted and applied
consistently therewith.

SARMC02169
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St. Alphonsus overview
October 11 2001
Page?.
vote. MRIA provides MRI services through two limited partnerships,
MRI Center of Idaho LP ( 1'MRICI") whose primary operations are the
provision o( MRI services on the campus of SARMC and MRI Mobile LP
("MRIM") which provides mobile MRI imaging on routes thro..1ghout
Idaho ~nd ir,,to Oregon, Washi.ngtor. and Nevada,
The radiology group associated with St. Alphonsus, Gem State
Radiology ( "GSR"} , does the reads for the magnets on the SAR.MC
campus but does not share in the profitability of the facility,
which is a source of significant aggravation to GSR. This
situation may be further exacerbated by the fact that two of the
physician general partners were founding members of GSR. SARMC
would like t.o share ownership of the magnets on its campus with GSR
and enter into additional jo~nt ventures in adjoining communities
with the practice. Unfortunately, the non-compete agreement
contained in General Pnrtnership Agreement for MRlA precludes SARMC
from doing so.
SARMC has been exploring ways to exit MRIA but has met resiscance
from the other general partners 1 particularly the physiciall:,, and
from Jack Floyd, the recently appointed CEO of MRIA. (Reasons for
this resistance are discussed later in the memorandum.) From the
correspondence provided, SARMC is frustrated with the situation and
is strongly considering simply withdrawing from MRIA and competing
with the exiting MRI facilities on its own campus nfter the end ot 1
the one~year r.on~compctc agreement.
SARMC has been advised by
counsel that this option would likely engender litigation with
MRIA.
SHP has been engaged by SARMC to prepnx~ o .Stra::egic Options
Assessment { 11 SOA"} tcgardi:ig the options available for achieving
their objectives of own:ing the facilities on their campus and being
permitted to enter into addiLional joi11t venture MRI facilities
with GSR. Further, SARMC has made it clear that they cannot use
any funds of St. Alphonsus, nor can they incur debt, to achieve
these objectives. As per the engagement agreement, SHP must
deliver the SOA by October 21, 2001. Following the completion of
the SOA, SHP will advise SARMC on a potential transaction involving
that ownership stake.

ownership and operations of MRI Associates GP and Affiliates
Ownership Structure

SH 0764
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Regional Medico( Center
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Struta9ic Options Auessmenl - MRIA lus«iotes

St. AlphoMus Reg!~nal Medical C8nler

Overview of MRIA and Affiliates
Overview
MPJA ha gener;,.l p,\!UH:rshlp that ddivcn fixed and nwbile MR[ ~l:':rvict,s through tl'l'_f> !imit<".<1

P~:.r:!'<:iJhipS,.. ~ffilCI_ ao_() \~fP"!:

...

"

M:RIA h,,s no ,1%,;t~ and pr,wi,k~ no scnice., din:clly. ln~rc~cl, 1'1RIA. .-i<""rivl:':, r,·v.-n111:-: frnrn
1rurn,i.gemel'lt foe~ charged to MRJC! and MRlM •:qual rn apprr.Jximaceli· 7:~':'!,. qf._rey_c:nuc. ln
addition, tiRL\ re<:dves distrlburfon,; for iL, din.·cr. t,wnersldp iiitcn~si~ in·\,JRfCl ~r,d -~1RIM.

•

MR/Cl·, opcradom l'.onsi.it_. prh1.1arUr, i)f ttH: provision of MRI savk(:s on r.he. SAR.lvlC (;amriu~,
<;}wn, it O¼'nS tw,, rnag-nr.,t8. MRIM (dhi.mscd bdowi k:L~es s,:rv\c,~, trnm emplovc:(;S
Mf/.JCL

•

MlUM began by oilcr\ng mobik h-1.Rf. ~c1v1c<n t.o rb.c other h\)apitalr. wH.hin the grncr:.J parm<mhip.
These! mobile rn~tgm:.n h:we liin,:e been repl~-1\:ed. ,.,i1h fixed .magnet~ but th1: relationship n:rnruns
with M:RIM, Iu addition. MRIM nms i-outes t.hrough0u.t lib.ho an<l lu.H.> Oregon, Washington ar1"d
Nevil<.tl. and phi-n~ thrthcr cxpan~ion in !),font:ana.

,,f

Ownership.
MRIA, MRlCI au<l MR!M (colkcuvdy-th,:: "Entilies",l an: principally owned hy four area healrh mtc-mit
(indudi.ngSAKMC), and aphy.~ldan inv~Mn!" g-rnup, I\n(:tm·~ Magnr:tk R,:mnan<:~. he (';DMR"i A
brief <kstripu.on of e,11:h shareh.oldcr follow.,.

•

St. Alph<msus Regiimal Medka.! Center: SARMC primarily r<.)misL\ of ;1 28 l-h<ei.1 facility in Boi~<', I!).
!t i.1 a mernlwr 1.1f Trinity Health (forrnaly a mcrnbci-(,f J.-lnly Crn~s Health S)-'.'ilcm prior t.o its
merger wi1.il M.cr<y) ;md i, tile desigrw.wd trnuma omter in thl' Bois,.; region.

•

llfodN<.>"~ MedNo~· i~ a for-prnli!, wh<,lly-owncd suhddhry nf Mt:'.r<:y t,..kdical Ccmcr, N;tmpa, :,
Catholic Health Initiat.i.v~~ facility.

SARMC06448
Office of the CFO
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St. A!phonsus R:egioncJ Medical Center

w

Overview of MRIA and Affiliates (cont'd)
The ownership structures of h'.lRI.A and its affili.ites are prtscntcd below:

lilDMR

8SARMC

OMtclN<>w
Cl rffi..\1C

aH~1>l(b1'm'><

0....-,.,.,.,,bip of MJU(.."l

<.1-M,.,nhip ,,f UR.IM

lllinl,U~

11%

-~ARMC

85.\RMC

OMr.d-'fo'"'

O!,hdNow

CJH.RMC

< 0 % ~. .

•He:l!U\Tr,11<1

SIO!h~u
•MRI.A

J(IJ'p

• fft"..t!dl'T ru,;i

!%

'Ql(Hfier,

'"

aMRJ.\
GMlUGl
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St. Alphonsus - MRIA
Rcstrilcturc Proposal
Discussion Outline w/ Dr. Curran

1. Objective:

>

Si\RMC desires to make an offer to acquire all non-Si\RMC interests in
MRlCI. Discuss process of MR!A collapse and exchange of MR!M units
(collectively, the "Transaction").

>

As previously descrined, SARMC's primary motivation ,n pursuing the
process to restructure the MRlA partnerships, is to allow SARMC to enter
into a fully aligned partnership with the rndiology group, !Ml.

>

In order for Si\RMC to execute the Transaction that gives it complete
ownership of MRJCI. it must have simultaneously negotiated a transaction
with the !Ml physicians to buy into/merge their facilities with MR!Cl.

;.; Therefore, the valuation of MR!Cl must he agreed upon by Si\RMC, DMR
and JMJ, as well as the other MRlA partners.

2. Desired Process:

>

Shattuck Hammond needs to update its financial model with the final year-end
results for MRlA, MRlCl and MRIM.

~

Shattuck Hammond nee<ls lu reconfirm its rorecasl assumptions given curren!

murket conditions.
}>

In order to assure that the forecast assumptions are in line with what would be

acceptable to IMI to buy into MRJCJ, Shattuck Hammond would like to get
the permission of the DMR physicians to review our conclusions on
forecasted volume trends, reimburse.ment trends, expense asSumptions,

discount rates and terminal values - and consequently a derived valuation
range - with Jeff Cliff.

>

If this range is generally agreeable to Jeff Cliff, SARMC would present the
values of MRI/\, MR!Cl and MRIM to DMR and present a proposal of how
the pa11nerships could be restructured to provide SARMC complete ownership
of MRlCl and dispose of its ownership interest in MRIM.

>

Consummaiion of the transaction will still be dependent upon SARMC antJ
IM! simultaneously effecting a merger transaction of the MR!Cl and lMI
businesses.

SH 1200
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@
Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center

February 24, 2004

Via Hand Delivery
J. Roger Curran, M.D.

Chairman, Board of Partners
MRI Associates
4227 Tio Lane
Nampa, Idaho 83686
Re: Notice of Withdrawal

Dear Dr. Curran:
For numerous reasons Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("SADC') has decided to
withdraw as a partner in MRI Associates, Inc. Saint Alphonsus has on four occasions
tried to buy the MRl Center ofldaho operations and achieve a mutual agreeable
withdrawal from MR1 Associates. This has been done at great expense to Saint
Alphonsus and without success. Recent experience suggests that further attempts will
likewise not be successful.
Saint Alphonsus therefore concludes that it is compelled to withdraw from the MRI
Associates. Please consider this letter as notice, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 53-3601 as Saint Alphonsus' express will to withdraw effective as of April 1, 2004.
Upon Saint Alphonsus' dissociation on the date described above, MRI Associates is
obligated to purchase Saint Alphonsus' interest in compliance with Idaho Code Section
53-3-701. The buyout price is equal to the greater of the amount that would be
distributed to Saint Alphonsus if the partnership were liquidated as of withdrawal date or
the value based on a sale of the entire business as a going concern without Saint
Alphonsus as a partner and the business wound up as of that date. Please consider this
letter as a demand for payment at that price.
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 53~3-701 (e), ifwe arc unable to agree upon a price for
Saint Alphonsus' interest within 120 days from the date of this demand for payment, then
MRI Associates is obligated to pay to Saint Alphonsus the amount MRl A,gsociates
estimates is due, plus interest. That estimate must be accompanied by the items identified

l 055 North Curtis Road • Boise, Idaho 83706-! 370 • /208) 367·2121 • www.saintalphomus.o:g
A MEMllER OF® TRINITY HEAi.TH
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IM ;jj Mobile I
11\l;II Center of Idaho]
~ ~ of

Excellence

March 5, 20(!4

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT
OFFER MAl)E PURSUANT TO LR E 408

Sandra Bnicc
Chief Executive Office,
St. /\!p'.·1on!-:us Regional Mt\dical Center
1055 North Cu11is Road
Boise, lD 83706
Re:

MRI Associates

Dear $3.ndra:

MRf Associa:es ("MR!A") has received your letter of withdrawal from MRJA
which discussed your perception th::i.t the transaction you desire could not be
achieved. V./c nre concerned that the v,:ithdrawal of SL Alphonsus Re3ional
Medical Cemer ("SARMC") from MR1A could lead to lirigation. In order lo
avoid such a result, and before MRl1\ rcsronds formally to that letter, MRIA
wanted to offer SARMC the opportunity to purchase the ~1RI Center of Idaho
("MRI Center") and lo sell its interest in MRI Mobile Limited Partnership
("MRI Mobik1 '). This is the transaction that you proposed rind Lhc one that
\VC Jrnvc hcen investigating. As yon know, \ifR IA has cmployc<i rrofessionals
to analyze its business in order to dctcnnine a reasonable and fair value for
both MR! Center and ~1Rl Mobile. That analysis has now been completed
and [he MRIA Board of Partners hilss unanimously directed us lo present this
offer to S/\RMC.

MBJ.~_mtr1:. MRIA hereby offers lo sell the MRI Center to SARMC based on
a valuation of MRI Center of$35,000,000 exclusive of its interest in MRl
Mobile, After adjustment for SARMC's combined partnership interests (i.e.,
GP and LP interests) this would rcyuire a $27,440,000 payment by SARMC.
Thal payment would be reduced by the purchase price for MRl Mobile
discussed in the next paragraph. The valuation was detennined on an Has is 0
basis with SAR.MC as a partner and without consideration of the savings tha1
SAR.MC may experience from its existing infrastructure.
MRI Mobile. MRlA hereby offers, in conjunction with the sale of the MR]
Center to SARJvlC, to purchase SARMC's interests in MRI Mobile based on a

valuation of MRI Mobile of $15,000,000. Therefore, the amount that MRJi\

EXHIBIT
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Expert Report of Bruce P. Budge
Saint AJphonsus Diversified Cm·c, Iuc., Plaintiff
v.
MRI Associates, LLP, Dcfe11dant

MRI Associntas,. LLP, Co:mtercln.inumt
V,

Saint Alpltomms Diversified Carn, Inc, et al., Co,mterdefeadan..ts
MlU Asspcintes, l.LP, 11rird ParhJ Plrdntiff
v.
f1ttennomtiai1t MadlCR.l lmagin~ LLC et ttl., Third Party Defondmt.ts

District Court of the Fourth Judicial rnstrlct of the State of Idaho, In and For the County of ADA
No. CV OC 04082l 9D

March 12, 2007
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MRIA Damages - From IMI Downtown

Lost Scans

I

434

Lost Profits

I

$252,749

I

2,033

I

3,01 I

I

2,600

I

2,180

I

1,950

I

I $ 1,254,972 I $1,927,852 I $1,566,169 I $ 1,37s,11s I $1,274,214 I

1,667

1,548

I

I 5,423

$963,754

$ 8os,so1

I

$ 9,420,332

MRIA Damages - From lMI Meridian
0\
"'1'

Lost Scans
Lost Profits

I 2,340 I 2,832 I 2,989 I 3,069 I
I ($1,542,722) I $ 1,249,386 I $ 1,608,108 I $1,711,793 I $ 1,523,221 I
I

I, 184

MRIA Damages - From IMI SARMC

Lost Scans

I

62

Lost Profits

I

$29,420

I

2,922

I

2,984

I $1,383,649 I $1,413,069

12,414
$4,549,786

I
1

•

Q.
Q.

<
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CERTIFICATE OF ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME
·

(Please type or print lf#glbly,

s,e, im1truc;tlons on reverse.)

,

. To the SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF IDAHO
Pursuant to Section 5,3-504, Idaho Code, the undersigned
· · gives notice of adopti()n of an Assurneg BL1stness N~me.
1. The assu!i:Jed business name which the undersjgned use(s) In. the transaction of
business Is:
·
·
MRI Center of Idaho
2. The true·name(s) and business addre$s(es) of the ~ntlty or lndlvldual(s) doing
business· under the assumf.!-d business name ls/are:
·
Name
c.ompJete Address

MRI limited Partners.hip

949 NQ.rt_h_.Cl!rti~ Road

·

se,

Bo 1

ldaho

83706

3. The general type of business transacted under the e~~ynied Ql.lSines~ 0~111~ is:
(ma,k only those lhat apply)

Gl
GI

· C&I

ReUii! Tr~de
.
Wholesale Trade.
·Services

_.

-

D · M~11ufac.tL1rln9 · D ·· Tr@nepo.rtatlon ~nr;I P4bflc. Utllitli:,s
D Asiricultur@
D · Finance; Insurance, and Real Estate
D Co'nstruction . [J Mining

4. The name_ and address to Which future
correspondence should be a~dressed:
Jeffrey· R. Cliff ..

Phone number (o~tional): --,---.....---,--,.--

P.O. Box 8359
Boise, ~~aho

_

e\.lbmit-9fll~vaf~ gf
Assumed Business
Name and $2.0~0I) fee to:

83707

5. Name and add~ess for this acknowledgment
-copy is (If blher tha11 # 4 above)_:·
Same

Secretary of State
700.WQst Jefferi}on
'Basement West' .
PO.Box 83720 .;

:i:;~~.;:;:0-ooao ~n,tary of State u111t onl1

.·. 8

Signature: __
t;_q_...,....·
...,_,_·...._·. , . . . . . . ~ - - - - -

Karl Kurtz
------.....----Member, Board of Partners

Printed· Name:
Capacity:

(sea Instruction # 8 on back or form)

CH000012
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